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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
CLOSE CORPORATION: TOWARD A
REALISTIC ETHIC
Lawrence E. Mitchellt
"The varied Protean-like forms which the term 'corporation' con-
ceals illustrate the consequences which ensue when the metaphor
obscures reality, when words intended as an aid to understanding
become a substitute for it, when connotations start a chain reac-
tion of new meanings."*
One striking aspect of both the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility' (CPR) and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2 (MRPC)
is their self-contained quality. In particular, they fail to relate con-
cepts of counsel's professional responsibility to the substantive law
governing client behavior.3 This is probably because ethics, as a
body of regulation concerned with the conduct of lawyers, histori-
cally has been treated as being on a wholly different plane from the
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* Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 435, 438 (1953). See also Kramer, Foreword, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 433, 434
(1953) ("The result is that businessmen and their counsel, whose legitimate needs find
expression and satisfaction in the close corporation, are often compelled to operate in
clouds of legal doubts and uncertainties and with realities masked by corporate fictions
necessitated by awkward legislation and judicial decisions.") (emphasis added).
I ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
2 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1984). Because different
jurisdictions have adopted the CPR and the MRPC to varying degrees, I will, for conven-
ience, refer to them together as the "Codes" where the distinctions between them do
not affect my analysis.
3 Cf Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role of the
Client, 1 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 43, 44 (1987) ("It is striking that both courts and lawyers
perceive codes of legal ethics as enjoying a special status separate from, and independ-
ent of, the general law."). Patterson makes this point in the slightly different context of
the consideration of professional ethics as an integral part of the "general law."
It should be noted, however, that some of the more blatant defalcations of counsel
constituting ethical violations derive directly from substantive law (e.g., embezzlement).
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 22, 23 (1953). Cf 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT XXX (Supp.
1986) ("the governing norms are the applicable code, 'other' law [chiefly common law],
and moral obligation.").
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substantive law with which lawyers deal.4 The fact that the Codes
have tended to build upon or derive from one another has com-
pounded this problem by perpetuating this failing.5
In fact, substantive law, and changes therein, may radically af-
fect the way lawyers approach their responsibilities and deal with
their clients. 6 The failure of the Codes to appreciate this reality is
particularly acute in determining the professional responsibility of
counsel to the shareholders, directors, and officers of close
corporations. 7
4 Patterson, supra note 3, at 48. See also 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 3, at
XXIX-XXXI. But cf. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the "80s
and Beyond, 67 A.B.A.J. 1116, 1118 (1981) ("The standards proposed by the commission
are based on an analysis of intracorporate relationships and internal corporate decision-
making structures, as these are defined by corporation and agency law."). As will be
shown, in the case of the ethical response to the problems of corporate counsel, signifi-
cant distinctions in the substantive law governing close corporations were largely unad-
dressed by the draftsmen of the MRPC, which accepted as its model the traditional
structure of the public issue corporation. See E. REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 89, 90 (1987). But see ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, Legal Background, at 147 (1984) [hereinafter Legal Background] (recognizing with
respect to Rule 1.13 that counsel to a close corporation has been held to represent the
shareholders "[wuphen a close corporation is indistinguishable from its owners."
Substantive law appears only to have been considered relevant in accepting the en-
tity theory of corporate organization, id., a theory which lacks relevance in the close
corporation. Mitchell, Close Cotporations Reconsidered, 63 TULANE L. REV. 1143 (1989).
The failure to take account of the substantive law of close corporations is particularly
disturbing in light of the proportionally greater number of close corporations to public
corporations in the United States. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORA-
TION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS § 5.1, at 38 (1976) (discussing data establishing that of the
approximately 1,740,000 active corporations in the United States in 1969-70, "[o]nly a
very few ... were publicly held"). For a similar statistical analysis see A. CONARD, COR-
PORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 118, 119 (1976); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAwS OF CORPO-
RATIONS § 257 (3d ed. 1983).
I suspect the failure of the MRPC fully to address the unique problems of close
corporations results partly from an institutional bias of the ABA Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards which drafted it. Of the eight practitioners serving on
that Commission who were listed in the 1983 Edition of Martindale-Hubbell, six were
members of firms with more than 50 lawyers. It is a fair guess that these firms deal
primarily with public corporations or with close corporations the shareholders of which
have sufficient wealth to afford independent representation.
5 Cf H. DRINKER, supra note 3, at 23-26 (summarizing the history of the develop-
ment of the MRPC.).
6 Indeed, as will be discussed, in the case of the close corporation it affects the way
lawyers identify their clients. Cf G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 54, 55
(1978).
7 A close corporation, for purposes of this Article, is a corporation in which the
shareholders have taken advantage of one or more statutory provisions or judicial deci-
sions which permit them to disengage the corporate machinery, wholly or partially, from
the traditional three-tiered statutory model of shareholders, directors, and officers. It
should be stressed that this Article focuses exclusively on close corporations in which
most, if not all, of the shareholders are managers, rather than those close corporations
in which non-management shareholders exist. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 12
(suggesting that some shareholders may not wish to participate in management). The
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There has been a significant re-evaluation and recasting of the
laws governing close corporations during the last forty years.8 The
analysis, as developed, does not turn on this distinction. A discussion of cases dealing
with judicial responses to the client identification problem in close corporations appears
infra in Parts II and III. Although very few reported cases have been found, and most of
these deal with disqualification of counsel in litigation, it appears that the courts have
not developed a consistent approach. See DeLaMaria v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &
Murphy, 612 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Wayland v. Shore Lobster & Shrimp Corp., 537 F. Supp.
1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Nulle, 127 Ariz. 299, 620 P.2d 214 (1980); Woods v. Supe-
rior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983); Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956); Torres v. Divis, 144 Ill. App. 3d 958, 494 N.E.2d 1227
(1986); Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 402 N.E.2d 574 (1980); Lowder
v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983); Terre du Lac Property
Owners' Ass'n v. Shrum, 661 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); In reJans, 295 Or. 289,
666 P.2d 830 (1983); In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983); In re Brownstein,
288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979); In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978). The
lack of consistent treatment in these cases is a result ofjudicial resolution on an ad hoc
basis. This Article attempts to remedy that situation.
8 See, e.g., Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Galler v. Gal-
ler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 177 Ind.
App. 224, 378 N.E.2d 941 (1978); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass.
842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1966); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201,
422 N.E.2d 798 (1981); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d
505 (1975); 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (1976);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
See also M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 9-10 n.2; F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1988); Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Con-
flicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (1987); Haynsworth, Competent
Counseling of Small Business Clients, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 401 (1980); Hetherington, Spe-
cial Characteristics, Problems and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. I [hereinafter
Hetherington, Special Characteristics]; Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778 (1952); O'Neal, Introduction to Sympo-
sium: Rights of 11inority Shareholders, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1987) Statutory Needs of
Close Corporations-An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General
Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849 (1985) [hereinafter Statutory Needs of Close Corpora-
tions]; Symiposium: The Close Corporation, 18 LAv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 433 (1953). But see
Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091 (1977) (court refuses to benefit minor-
ity at expense of majority in dispute over corporate repurchase of shares in the absence
of a corporate policy regarding repurchases or an agreement protecting minority.).
The court in Meiselman correctly summarized the prevailing view:
We note at the outset that the enterprises with which we are dealing are
close corporations, not publicly held corporations. This distinction is
crucial because the two types of corporations are functionally quite differ-
ent. Indeed, the commentators all appear to agree that "[cilose corpora-
tions are often little more than incorporated partnerships."
309 N.C. at 288, 307 S.E.2d at 557 (citing Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for
Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J. 128, 138). Close corporations embrace the tradi-
tional characteristics of corporations in the conduct of their business and in their deal-
ings with third parties, and behave as partnerships insofar as the intra-corporate
relationships among their shareholders, directors, and officers are concerned. Econo-
mists, as well as legal scholars, have recognized significant behavioral differences be-
tween close and public corporations. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6-7 (1932); Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 303, 305-07 (1983). See also Mitchell, supra note 4
(evaluating the validity of the different legal treatment of close corporations).
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most significant result has been the general recognition that the
shareholders of a close corporation are considered partners in their
dealings with one another and that the corporation is an entity only
with respect to the rest of the world. 9 Certainly that is the objective
of the participants.' 0 Consequently, application of the entity theory,
with its underlying concepts of corporate democracy, is ill-suited to
the economic and human behavior of these shareholders and to
their expectations." I These constituents think of themselves as part-
ners and behave accordingly. Yet with respect to third parties, and
the conduct of their business, they are a corporation like any
other. 12
Both the CPR and the MRPC fail to take account of this organi-
zational hybrid. Their guidance to corporate counsel is still based
upon the model of the large, publicly held corporation, 13 and thus
directs counsel that his duties and loyalties are to the entity. 14
9 See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.G. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Hether-
ington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciar.y Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 9, 27 (1987) [hereinafter Hetherington, Defining the Scope] ("Now that it is
clear under both statutes and case law that participants in close corporations can alter
the standard hierarchial management structure of stock corporations, the earlier view-
holding that joint venture arrangements could not survive the formation of the corpora-
tion-should be rejected, as it has been in more recent cases."). But see id. at 27, n.54;
Boss v. Boss, 98 R.I. 146, 200 A.2d 231 (1964);Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn.
1980).
10 Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
11 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d
657 (1977); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975);
Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983); Chittur, supra note
8, at 130 (entity theory not useful to, or accepted by, shareholders of close corpora-
tions); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, § 258; O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873 (1978). It should be noted that
close corporations which are not operated internally as partnerships may exist (although
it is unlikely there are many).
12 The close corporation, however, by its very nature, may be more subject to veil-
piercing and to disregard of the corporate fiction than publicly held corporations. See
W. GARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 80-103 (5th ed.
1980).
13 Kutak, supra note 4, at 1118, makes indisputably clear that the draftsmen of
MRPC Rule 1.13 (dealing with entity representation) relied exclusively on the traditional
corporate model. The Rule itself makes this equally clear. See infra note 14. See also S.
FITZGIBBON, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS 8 (1982) (In the MRPC,
"[tihe 'fiction' of the corporate personality is taken seriously. ... ); E. REICH, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES, supra note 4, at 4. Cf. Ehrlich, Common Issues
of Professional Responsibility, 1 GEo.J.L. ETHICS 3, 10-11 (1987) ("The Kutak Commission
grappled with the problems of lawyers in representing organizational clients and took
several steps beyond the prior code, which was totally silent on the matter. Yet many
issues regarding the ethical responsibilities of organization attorneys remain.").
14 EC 5-18 of the CPR provides:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, em-
ployee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In ad-
vising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his
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While the MRPC has gone some way toward recognizing that an or-
ganization may be legally viewed as an aggregate of individuals
rather than an entity and toward establishing a rule to cover that
situation, 15 it fails to take account of statutes and decisions dealing
with close corporations which, with increasing frequency, reject the
entity theory with respect to the relationship among close corpora-
tions' shareholders.' 6 Under the MRPC, counsel must look to the
exception, Rule 1.7 (dealing with conflicts of interest, ' 7 rather than
professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires
of any person or organization. Occasionally a lawyer for an entity is re-
quested by a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or
other person connected with the entity to represent him in an individual
capacity; in such cases the lawyer may serve the individual only if the law-
yer is convinced that differing interests are not present.
Rule 1.13 of the MRPC provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constitu-
ents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7 [dealing with conflict of inter-
est]. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required
by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
15 Legal Background, supra note 4, at 147 ("An unincorporated association, limited
partnership, joint venture or similar organization often is considered under other law...
to be an aggregate of individuals rather than an entity .... [If so] .... the lawyer has a
client-lawyer relationship with each member individually, and the obligations of the law-
yer are determined by the rules governing multiple representation."). See also Brown &
Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyering: A Review of the Model Rules,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 519. Nonetheless, close corporations are not treated by
"other law" as "aggregates of individuals." The Comments to Rule 1.13 suggest that it
will be exceptional for a close corporation to be treated in law as an aggregate of indi-
viduals rather than an entity. Thus, it was apparently believed that Rule 1.7, see infra
note 17, would be sufficient guidance for close corporations in which one or more share-
holders desire to be represented by corporate counsel.
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 4-
101 to 4-603 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-10 to 33-18-500 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1988);
see also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
17 Rule 1.7 of the MRPC provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that cli-
ent will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consulta-
tion shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.
470 [Vol. 74:466
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the rule, Rule 1.13 (dealing with entity representation), to deter-
mine to whom she owes her professional obligations. The CPR in-
dicates even more forcefully that multiple representation in general
is considered exceptional.' Moreover, the CPR, like the MRPC,
fails to guide counsel in the close corporation situation, but simply
directs her to the rule governing multiple representation.' 9 The
consequence is that the issue of client identification, notwithstand-
ing its frequent occurrence 20 is necessarily resolved by the lawyer on
a case-by-case basis.
Counsel to the close corporation is thus left without any mean-
ingful ethical guidance in determining the constituents to whom she
owes a duty, and in determining the scope of that duty. 21 The
Codes purport to tell her who her client is, but their failure to ac-
count for the impact of the substantive law on this problem renders
their dictates meaningless. Based on the traditional adversary
model of the lawyer's role,22 the Codes allow counsel to represent
18 DR 5-105 of the CPR states:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalfofa client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, ex-
cept to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may rep-
resent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
See also Comment to DR 5-105(C) of the CPR.
19 See EC 5-15 of the CPR (lawyer "should resolve all doubts against the propriety
of ... [multiple] representation").
20 Cf Haynsworth, supra note 8, at 452 (representation of multiple clients is one of
"[tihe two most frequent problems encountered by lawyers representing small
businesses .. ").
21 See supra notes 14-18; Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1335 (1981) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (EC 5-18
"is simple and unhelpful in equal measure. It begs the central question: What are the
entity's interests?"); Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate World: An
Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 350, 358-62 (1973) (address-
ing the simplistic nature of the entity theory in ethics analysis). Cf Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 259 (1967) ("By and large the
legal-historical developments and the economic functions of these two systems are quite
different, and meaningful legal or economic analysis must begin by recognizing this
fact."); O'Neal & Thompson, "ulnerabilit v of Professional-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 31 Bus. LAW. 1775, 1783 (1976) (analysis of attorney-client privilege in shareholder
litigation concluding that the duty of corporate counsel ultimately is to protect interests
of shareholders.); Van Dusen, Who is Counsel's Corporate Client, 31 Bus. LAW. 474, 475
(1975) (stating that in some situations consideration of the "entity's" interests requires
consideration of the interest of its shareholders).
22 Some consideration has been given by the MRPC to different roles. The CPR
1989]
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multiple parties when the lawyer's duties of undivided care and at-
tention and undivided loyalty will not be compromised. 23 This ap-
proach presents a much less significant problem in the case of the
public corporation, for the MRPC (and to a lesser degree the CPR)
is predicated explicitly upon the entity theory of the corporation, 24 a
theory which retains vitality in the public context. Modern law,
however, has largely stripped the close corporation of its entity
mask with respect to intracorporate relations,25 so that counsel to a
close corporation will no longer have an entity interposed between
her and the ultimate owners of the business. Because counsel's con-
duct will thus directly affect each of these shareholders, it should be
recognized that counsel owes a duty to each of them.26 The behav-
ior of these shareholders toward one another will be regulated by
their fiduciary duties, 27 a legal concept which clients can evaluate
hardly deals with the issue. Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 520 ("Nonadversarial
lawyering is barely mentioned in the Code; the professional and ethical dilemmas
unique to the nonlitigating counselor are scarcely admitted to-both, reflections of the
fact that this part of the underlying model is scarcely there."); cf Pierce, supra note 21, at
350 (CPR leaves role of corporate lawyer largely unaddressed).
23 Postema, MIoral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 158 (M. Davis & F. Elliston eds. 1986) (implicit in the CPR is the unsustainable
implication that a lawyer can separate his professional personality from his "other"
personality).
24 And to that extent has considered substantive law. See Kutak, supra note 4 and
sources listed supra note 21.
25 See 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 557-58, 362 A.2d
75, 85 (1976); cf. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 438 (1953).
26 This Article assumes for the reasons discussed in Part II that the shareholders
will also be directors and officers of the corporation, and does not separately address the
duties of non-shareholder directors and officers to shareholders and other constituents
of the corporation. Cf., e.g., 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546,
557, 362 A.2d 78, 84 (1976) ("It would.. . be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as
shareholders from those done as directors . . ." where ownership and control were uni-
fied.).
In re Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979), discussed infra note 148, directly
confronts the issue and unequivocally answers (correctly, I think) the frequently asked
(and as frequently unanswered) question of who the client is in the close corporation.
Unlike the other cited cases, Brownstein holds that the "client" consists of the sharehold-
ers as well as the corporation. However, it fails to guide counsel in determining whether
or when separate representation of each shareholder, or group of shareholders, is ap-
propriate. But see Felty v. Hartweg, 169 Ill. App. 3d 406, 119 Il. Dec. 799, 523 N.E.2d
555 (1988) (rejecting the proposition that counsel to a close corporation owes a duty to
minority shareholders in their capacity as such); Torres v. Divis, 144 Ill. App. 3d 958,
964, 494 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (App. Ct. 1986) ("It would be unwise to impose on an
attorney, retained by only one of several incorporators for the purpose of organizing a
corporation, a duty to act on behalf of all of the incorporators in the absence of an
agreement that he do so."). Moreover, Brownstein has been modified, as discussed infra
note 148, and the scope of its dictum is not clear.
27 This duty is clearly owed only in the relationship of a controlling interest to a
non-controlling interest. Galler v. Caller, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Smith v.
Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981); Hetherington,
472 [Vol. 74:466
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only upon advice from counsel.28 Since each shareholder will seek
to maximize his own welfare,29 sole counsel to a close corporation
and its shareholders will always, to a greater or lesser extent, be
compromised in duties of care and loyalty.30 Even the seemingly
menial task of drafting a set of corporate by-laws requires judg-
Defining the Scope, supra note 9; cf S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 12 (in partnership
situation, fiduciary duty mediates between the parties); Chittur, supra note 8, at 170 (op-
pression of non-controlling shareholders should be defined by reference to (i) reason-
able expectations of the shareholders and (ii) fiduciary duties). But see Zimmerman v.
Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849 (Mass. 1988) (one 50%o shareholder held to be able to bring
action for breach of fiduciary duty against other 50% shareholder).
The fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders toward minority shareholders is de-
rived directly from the fiduciary duty of directors and officers to shareholders and indi-
rectly from the law of trusts. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, § 240. In the close
corporation context, this duty has been likened to that of partners to one another.
Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Caller v. Caller, 32 Ill. 2d 16,
203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d
657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
28 Cf Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, in ETHICS AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 114, 125 (M. Davis & F. Elliston eds. 1986) (clients not capable of
resolving legal issues without guidance of counsel).
The fiduciary duty itself essentially is a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Perhaps
the most famous description of this duty (which the reader familiar with corporate law
will forgive me for repeating) is then Judge Cardozo's famous dictum in Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463, 64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1926) which illustrates the proposi-
tion in the text, that such duty cannot be evaluated without the assistance of counsel:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enter-
prise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are for-
bidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
Professor Hetherington has observed that the standard of conduct of shareholders
to one another clearly is not self-executing. Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note
9, at 12-13 ("Despite the all-embracing tone ofjudicial rhetoric in fiduciary duty cases,
the results make it clear that these pronouncements ... are not to be taken literally.")
See also infra note 98.
29 See infra note 59.
30 G. HAZARD, supra note 6, at 78-79, is worth quoting at length:
Clients do not have a conflict of interest simply because their interests
diverge or because an intense legal dispute could arise between them
.... People have conflicts of interest only if, in addition to having diver-
gent interests, one or both wish to pursue them beyond a certain degree
of aggression. Whether they wish to do so inevitably depends on circum-
stances. It also depends on the legal advice they may get, which turns the question
into a circle. (emphasis added)
This last sentence is a fascinating observation in the context of this discussion. Leaving
aside for a moment the questions of (i) whether an inchoate conflict of interest is in fact
a conflict of interest, and (ii) what that "certain degree of aggression" is which turns an
inchoate conflict of interest into an actual conflict of interest, this sentence suggests that
such conflicts can be created (or at least made tangible) by counsel competently advising a client of
the full extent of his rights or the boundaries of his duties. This observation highlights
the need for guidelines which permit counsel to fulfill her duty without creating conflicts
for herself and her clients in the process. See Wasserstrom, supra note 28. Cf Brown &
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ments, sometimes subtle and sometimes not, allocating control
among the various parties.3 1 In such a situation the lawyer's human
qualities may well lead to subtle favoritism of one constituent over
another.3 2
This does not necessarily suggest that a lawyer should never
undertake the representation of a close corporation where the
shareholders are not represented individually. 33 There may be per-
fectly good reasons for such representation and circumstances in
which it is appropriate.34 Further, although empirical evidence is
scarce, 35 it is likely that this practice is common. The problem left
unresolved by the Codes is when such representation should not be
undertaken short of circumstances in which tangible conflicts ex-
Dauer, supra note 15, at 532 ("In preventive lawyering the facts are mostly in the future
.... "1).
For the proposition that an inchoate conflict of interest is nonetheless a real con-
flict, see F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 2.02, at 2 ("Participants in close
corporations almost always have conflicting interests .... There are few "neutral" deci-
sions .... "); Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1977).
31 Cf S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 11 (charter and by-laws direct counsel how to
act for corporate constituents).
32 Aronson, supra note 30, at 826; Pierce, supra note 21, at 369. Cf Fried, The Lawyer
as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976)
(asserting that such favoritism is morally defensible and even necessary).
33 Cf Hazard, Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, I GEO. J.L.
ETHICS 15, 38 (1987) ("In a triangular relationship in the normal state, the interests of
the nonlawyer participants are not adverse; both, therefore, may be considered to be
clients."). But see Haynsworth, supra note 8, at 457-67, 472 (suggesting that the "wise"
lawyer will not undertake such representation "if there is any substantial likelihood that
[a conflict of interest] might arise"). Contra S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 12 (arguing
that where the various participants have chosen to bind together their fate, and opt for
the common good, there should be no requirement of separate representation, due to
the extra expense involved, unless separate lawyers are specifically needed or sought).
See also infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for arguments disputing both these
views.
34 Efficiency and economy argue in favor of multiple representation. See S. FITZGIB-
BON, supra note 13, at 12; Haynsworth, supra note 8, at 461; Hazard, supra note 6, at 74;
Kipnis, Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Obligation, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
283, 286 (M. Davis & F. Elliston eds. 1986). The fact that multiple counsel may inject
greater adversity into negotiation argues further in favor of representation by one law-
yer. S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 12 ("the introduction of opposing counsel would
likely give the whole matter an adversarial cast .... ); Haynsworth, supra note 8, at 461
(presence of multiple counsel may increase the adversarial nature of negotiations);
Kipnis, supra, at 258 (to same effect); G. HAZARD, supra note 6, at 73 (where no real
conflict of interest exists, added expense and distress caused by retention of separate
counsel suggests use ofjoint representation); Hetherington, Special Characteristics, supra
note 8, at 16-17 ("... the lawyer who decides to play Cassandra and to recommend
arrangements to handle possible future difficulties ... may introduce dissension .. ").
35 But see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966); Statutory Needs of Close Coyporations,
supra note 8 (empirically examining the most useful and effective methods of providing
special legal treatment for close corporations).
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ist.3 6 The question, then, is whether there is a way of categorizing
close corporations which will enable us to develop guidelines to
help counsel determine at the outset of her representation whether
separate representation for each constituent (or constituent group)
is required.
A review of the facts of the reported cases and of the commen-
taries suggests a partial answer to this question. The cases and liter-
ature suggest that close corporations come to be organized in a
variety of predictable ways, with classes of predictable partici-
pants. 37 By identifying the ways in which close corporations typi-
cally are formed, it is possible to identify situations which, from the
beginning, are more likely to involve inherent conflicts that may put
counsel in an untenable position (or, if she later withdraws, put the
shareholders in an untenable position).38 This process may in turn
lead to the development of a series of ethics rules which will assist
counsel in determining at the outset whether to undertake represen-
tation of a close corporation (and therefore its shareholders) or
whether to suggest that all or certain of the shareholders seek sepa-
rate representation. Therefore, this Article will first examine some
of the characteristics of close corporations which make their counsel
particularly vulnerable to conflicts of interest. It will then establish
(based on reported cases and, in part, on my own practical experi-
ence) a typology of close corporations by examining the various
ways in which these corporations come into being. After examining
the typology in the context of facts found in reported cases, I will
discuss the lawyer's conflicting roles in each situation, and deter-
mine whether they are so inconsistent with her proper role and the
parties' expectations that they always should be avoided. This Arti-
cle then concludes with a proposed rule of ethics which will guide
counsel, when undertaking the representation of a close corpora-
tion, in determining the identity of the client and for whom in-
dependent representation is required. Such a rule may provide
36 And thus where the CPR (DR 5-105) and MRPC (Rule 1.7) clearly would pro-
hibit such representation.
37 See infra Part II.
38 Cf Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity's Ethical Considerations-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 453, 469 (1976)
("The withdrawal of an advisor may have just as deleterious an effect upon the client as
the withdrawal of a litigator. Yet neither advisor nor advocate is asked to weigh the
potential harm of withdrawing against the benefits of accepting employment."); Note,
Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interests,
73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1067 (1964) (disqualification of counsel may result in loss to client of
aid of long standing counsel); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 220
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (noting hardship imposed on parties having to retain independent coun-
sel during course of litigation), aff'd in part, rev"d in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
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meaningful guidance to counsel and provide a basis for consistency
in her decision making.
I
THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
A. Structural and Human Conflicts
Judges, legislators and scholars increasingly are in substantial
agreement that the close corporation is a unique legal creature, dif-
ferent from its publicly held cousin in certain essential respects.3 9
Yet there is a lack of agreement on what precisely a close corpora-
tion is. Various factors have been used in defining such corpora-
tions including, either singly or in combination, (1) a small number
of shareholders, 40 (2) restrictions on share transferability, 4 1 (3) a
disregard of corporate formalities, 42 (4) the substantial personal in-
teraction of participants, 43 (5) a lack of significant trading of securi-
ties,44 (6) an election to be treated as a close corporation, 45 (7) a
39 See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Comolli v. Comolli, 241
Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Caller v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964);
Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 177 Ind. App. 224, 378 N.E.2d 941 (1978);
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981); Meiselman v. Meisel-
man, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J.
Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (1976); A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 8. But see CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 24-30 (1986); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8; Chittur, supra
note 8; Fama & Jensen, supra note 8; Hetherington, Special Characteristics, supra note 8;
Hetherington & Dodley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Re-
maining Close Cotporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977); Manne, supra note 21; O'Neal,
supra note 8; Statutory Needs of Close Corporations, supra note 8; Symposium: The Close Corpora-
tion, supra note 8; Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, at 27 n.54 (suggesting
that a few states continue to apply traditional corporate doctrine to the relationship
among shareholders in close corporations). See also Boss v. Boss, 98 R.I. 146, 200 A.2d
231 (1964) (same in Rhode Island); Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1980)
(rejecting special treatment of close corporations in Tennessee).
40 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 582, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(1975); Darvin v. Belmont Indus., Inc., 40 Mich. App. 672, 677, 199 N.W.2d 542, 544
(1972); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1967).
41 CAL. CORP. CODE § 421 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1974); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 1203 (Smith-Hurd 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-73(b) (1982).
42 Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574
(1972); Somers v. AAA Temporary Serv., Inc., 5 Ill. App. 3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462
(1972); Roos v. Aloi, 127 Misc. 2d 864, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1985); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 300(e) (West 1977).
43 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1.02.
44 Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935); Wasserman v. Rosen-
garden, 84 I1. App. 3d 713,406 N.E.2d 131 (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (1967);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1982).
45 CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 1204 (Smith-
Hurd 1970); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 4-201 (1985).
476 [Vol. 74:466
REALISTIC ETHIC
substantial identity of ownership and management,46 (8) propor-
tionately substantial wealth invested by each shareholder in the cor-
poration,47 and (9) the illiquidity of ownership interests. 48
The most significant characteristics for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle are the last three, the substantial investment by participants,
the illiquidity of ownership interests, 49 and the substantial identity
of ownership and management. These characteristics make the na-
ture of shareholder relations in close corporations different from
that in their public counterpart-50-in the public corporation, dissat-
isfied shareholders can withdraw from the enterprise with relative
ease.5' In the public corporation, counsel to the entity may find her-
self embroiled in the conflicts between the board of directors and
management, or between management and shareholders, or some
combination of these. The conflicts with which she deals are be-
tween or among different constituent groups with reasonably well
defined legal rights and responsibilities with respect to one an-
other.5 2 When conflicts arise among the constituents of close cor-
46 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1.07, at 24-25. See also Zion v. Kurtz,
50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980) (applying Delaware law); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, para. 1212 (Smith-Hurd 1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620(b) (McKinney 1986).
47 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1.08, at 31-32.
48 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). See F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1.07, at 24-28 (for a listing of additional charac-
teristics and for the proposition that some of the characteristics may fade over time);
Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corporation: A Critique and a Corporate Planning ,41ternative, 36
MD. L. REV. 289 (1976) (listing statutorily required characteristics of close
corporations).
49 H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, § 257; cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 39, at 6 (the problem of exploitation of minority shareholders by the majority in
close corporations is "uniquely 'elated to illiquidity .... ); Hetherington, Special Charac-
teristics, supra note 8, at 11. This characteristic always results from a lack of a market for
the securities of a close corporation and may also result from transfer restrictions in the
corporation's charter and/or by-laws or as provided in shareholders' agreements.
Although close corporation literature generally deals with oppression of minority
interests by the majority, the reverse can also occur. For the proposition that control of
a close corporation is not necessarily congruent with control of a majority of voting
shares, see Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798
(1981); cf Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
50 And thus, too, the ethical problems of counsel. Cf Shapiro, supra note 48, at 291
("Close corporation statutes tend to reflect an inadequate grasp of the critical role
played by the personalities and private motivations in any 'small' business.").
51 Hetherington, Special Characteristics, supra note 8, at 20 ("The position of minority
interests in close corporations is unique. Participants in partnerships ... are not ...
stranded by the law if they are excluded by their associates from full participation in the
enterprise."); id. at 21 (the liquidity of public corporation stock serves as a safety valve
for dissatisfied minority shareholders); Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278
(1978) (repurchase by close corporation of its stock to cement control by majority "de-
preciated" interest of minority). See also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52 The rights of shareholders, directors, and officers of the public corporation are
established by state corporation statutes which were drafted with these entities in mind.
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porations, however, the lawyer representing the entity typically will
be trapped between individual shareholders or groups of sharehold-
ers, of whom the most that can be said is that they owe one another
a fiduciary duty.53 These people generally are also the managers
and directors of the enterprise. 54 As a result, counsel for the close
Manne, supra note 21, at 276 n.26. Under this model the business and affairs of the
corporation are "managed by or under the direction of" the Board of Directors, see, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141 (1967), with certain limited rights of approval granted to the
shareholders. The law has developed largely in response to the problems of the separa-
tion of ownership and control presented by this model. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra
note 12, at 208-19. In contrast, the laws governing close corporations permit infringe-
ment on corporation statutes. E.g., Caller v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
Statutes have also permitted close corporations to achieve some of the characteristics of
partnerships. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. Thus, in terms of legal char-
acteristics, the close corporation more nearly resembles a partnership than a public cor-
poration complying with the statutory model. Israels, supra note 10, at 491-92.
Consistent with the statutory model, when conflicts among constituents arise in the
public corporation the MRPC seems to conclude that counsel has satisfied her ethical
obligations by good faith compliance with the directives of the Board of Directors. See
Kutak, supra note 4, at 1118; see also S. FiTZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 11 (charter and by-
laws direct lawyers as to how to act for corporate constituents).
The fundamental device for governance of intracorporate relations in the close cor-
poration is the principle of fiduciary duty. On the scope of fiduciary duties and the
persons possessing them in close corporations, see Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra
note 9. Professor Hetherington comments: "With respect to the benefits and risks
which the parties intend to share, fiduciary obligations between shareholders are en-
forcement devices for implementing the intent of the parties." Id. at 19; see also M. Ei-
SENBERG, supra note 4, at 17; O'Neal, supra note 11. Professor Hetherington further
notes that the expectations of shareholders are "remarkably uniform," and that fiduciary
duties may be well suited for enforcing those expectations. Hetherington, Defining the
Scope, supra note 9, at 21. Finally, he argues that the limits to controlling shareholders'
fiduciary duties (as well as those of directors and officers) have been created by balanc-
ing interests among participants in corporations and are consistent with the interests
and expectations of investors. See id. at 22-23.
Whether this is a change in his analysis since 1969, see infra note 53, or whether
developments in the case law such as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353
N.E.2d 657 (1976), and Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422
N.E.2d 798 (App. Ct. 1981), have changed his mind, Professor Hetherington's argu-
ments for the utility (and improvement) of the fiduciary doctrine are useful. The utility
of the fiduciary principle in governing intra-shareholder relations forms an essential part
of my argument in Part III of this article.
53 Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, passim. With respect to the efficacy
of fiduciary principles in protecting minority shareholders of close corporations, Profes-
sor Hetherington has observed:
The legality of the majority's conduct is tested first against specific statu-
tory criteria [which I have observed is largely inapplicable, or at least
highly permissive, in the close corporation context], and second against
the common law principle that in the exercise of its managerial preroga-
tives the controlling group may not be motivated primarily by its own
partisan interests, but must seek to maximize the interests of all con-
cerned. The complexity of business situations and the plurality of mo-
tives drastically limit the effectiveness of the latter principle.
Hetherington, Special Characteistics, supra at 28. But see supra note 52.
54 Israels, supra note 10, at 491.
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corporation typically will have regular contact with these sharehold-
ers and may well have personal relationships with some or all of
them, each of whom is likely to have a significant financial stake in
the enterprise. Counsel to the close corporation may often find it
difficult to determine who speaks for this "entity" the Codes insist
she represents. 55 She will particularly be stymied in making this de-
termination when the distribution of ownership is relatively equal,
for under such circumstances each shareholder will legitimately ex-
pect that the corporation will fulfill his individual interests.56
Another problem in identifying who speaks for the corporation
lies in determining that person's real interest; in other words,
whether such person is speaking in the corporation's best interests
or his own.57 In the public corporation model, once the lawyer has
identified the appropriate speaker, she is entitled to assume that
such person is motivated by the best interests of the entity.58 In the
case of the close corporation, however, counsel is more likely to find
individual participants attempting to realize their personal goals
through the enterprise. Those goals may be inconsistent with the
best interests of the enterprise as a whole.59 This point is intensified
55 See cases cited supra note 7, all of which deal with this difficulty; Developments in the
Law, supra note 21, at 1335. At least in the public corporation model, counsel is pro-
tected by the MRPG when she relies in good faith on directives of the board. Kutak,
supra note 4.
56 Of course the legitimacy and reasonableness of these expectations may depend
upon the existence of mechanisms such as voting agreements or super-majority voting
provisions which give each shareholder a right to veto significant actions. See, e.g.,
Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,
12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981). Nevertheless, the shareholders might
reasonably expect that such a veto right will not be abused.
57 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981),
left open the question of whether a shareholder in a close corporation is required to act
in the coporation's best interests, assuming no breach of a fiduciary duty of the other
shareholders. There the court modified the balancing test established in Wilkes v. Spr-
ingside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) (breach of fiduciary
duty must be measured against a reasonable business purpose asserted by the control-
ling shareholder and whether there exists a less damaging means of accomplishing that
purpose) to take account of the competing business interests of each shareholder. In so
doing, the court implicitly recognized that in a close corporation, the "corporation" has
no best interests; rather, the only relevant interests are those of the individual share-
holders. See also infra note 59.
58 The MRPC takes this approach. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.13 comment (1984); Kutak, supra note 4; Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1336,
1337.
59 See supra note 55. Cf Torres v. Divis, 144 Ill. App. 3d 958, 494 N.E.2d 1227
(1986) ("The interests of the incorporators of a closely held business are not always the
same, and they are often adverse. Each incorporator may seek to maximize his personal
return and to minimize his personal contributions."); KLEIN & COFFEE, BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATION AND FINANCE 40 (2d ed. 1986) (each investor seeks to maximize his wealth);
Chittur, supra note 8; Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, at 39 ("Equity inves-
tors are assumed to be rational wealth maximizers .... ).
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by the fact that the shareholders in a close corporation are likely to
be its directors and officers as well, 60 and thus have the power to
direct its affairs. The close corporation assumes singular impor-
tance to each of its shareholders as a vehicle for individual wealth
maximization and each shareholder will tend to see the enterprise as
existing to fulfill his individual needs.61 This, together with the con-
fining illiquidity of close corporation securities, throws the signifi-
cance of client identification into high relief because dissatisfied
shareholders may be unable to withdraw from the enterprise and
will have to protect their investments within its structure. 62
Thus the character of the conflict problems posed by the close
corporation differs, from the model envisioned by the Codes in at
least two significant dimensions: (i) on the structural level, because
the inter se relationship among the parties disregards the traditional
corporate model (and lacks the safety feature of liquidity possessed
by partnerships and public corporations), 63 and (ii) on the human
level, because the best interests of the "corporation" are, in reality,
the best interests of each of the shareholders rather than the best
interests of the entity.64 While this difference should not affect
60 See supra note 11.
61 But see S. FrTZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 11.
62 A reasonably close analogy to the problem of identifying the corporation's inter-
est arises in the context of shareholder derivative suits against directors or controlling
shareholders. As one court put it: "Simply stated, in a derivative suit a minority share-
holder places himself in the shoes of the corporation to enforce a corporate right, and
the interests of the plaintiff-shareholder and the corporate defendant become merged."
In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 555, 660 P.2d 660, 666 (1983). Cf Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (corporation in derivative suit, although
nominally a defendant, is in fact a plaintiff), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaeffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Schwartz v.
Gutermen, 109 Misc. 2d 1004, 441 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (applying same rule in
context of limited partnership). In Kinsey, the court reviewed the cases dealing with "the
defendants in a derivative action," 294 Or. at 556, 660 P.2d at 667, and concluded that,
while there was a split of authority, that split was one "in time" and that recent cases
established the impropriety of such representation. Id. at 557-58, 660 P.2d at 667-68.
The court concluded that such representation was improper "unless the claim [asserted
in such derivative actions] is patently sham or patently frivolous." Id. at 559, 660 P.2d at
669. Cf Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975) (holding that
counsel to a corporation could not take sides in a contest for corporate control).
Similarly, in a close corporation, where ownership and control merges so that the
shareholders have become the corporation, counsel should be prohibited from taking
sides in a conflict among the shareholders. See infra note 98. This does not, however,
address the question of whether counsel should represent such a corporation before
conflict actually appears. Cf Kinsey, 294 Or. at 553-54, 660 P.2d at 665 (no ethical viola-
tions when counsel undertook representation of corporation and controlling sharehold-
ers where initially no clear conflict existed).
"(3 See supra notes 39-52. The liquidity of partnerships inheres in their free dis-
solvability. But this freedom may be limited by agreement, thus creating a problem
similar to that found with respect to close corporations.
64 See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THoMpsoN, supra note 8. Of course, whether the
"entity" has its own best interests is a matter of dispute even in the public corporation
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counsel to the close corporation with respect to the corporation's
conduct of its business, that is, in its quotidian relationships with
third parties, 65 it will necessarily affect her ability to function as
an initiator, planner and advisor to the close corporation regarding
governance, finance, and the long-range planning of its
operations. 66
B. The Role of Counsel
Before examining a proposed typology of close corporations
and how the conflicts previously described may pose ethical
problems in each type, it is worth taking a moment to examine how
the lawyer's concept of her role, and clients' expectations, magnify
the conflicts problem in the context of a close corporation.6 7 As has
been noted, the CPR pays very little attention to the corporate law-
yer, proceeding as it does on the basis of the traditional advocacy
model.68 The MRPC makes some attempt to recognize the lawyer's
counseling role,6 9 but still fails to integrate fully the planning role of
corporate counsel. The role of counsel in a nonadversarial setting is
quite different from that in the traditional litigation model.70 A
brief example will suffice to illustrate this role in the close corpora-
tion context. 7 1
context. See supra note 62 (with respect to derivative actions). However, the dispute in
that context revolves around constituent groups (i.e., shareholders, directors, and of-
ficers) rather than individual constituents, and the courts make some effort to deal with
the potential conflicts on a group level. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660
(1983).
65 Cf Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1346 (courts will rarely find breaches
of fiduciary duties arising from ordinary business decisions but are more likely to find
such breaches in disputes over control in which "[t]he corporate attorney may be invited
to play a central role.").
66 This is because long-range planning may well be inseparable from the financial
goals of the corporation's shareholders. For example, a shareholder nearing retirement
age who, pursuant to an agreement among shareholders, must be "bought out" upon
retirement, will want to achieve significant short term improvement in those financial
measures upon which the repurchase price is based. However, increasing book value
may have very different consequences for the enterprise than increasing earnings. And
increasing short-term earnings may have very different consequences than increasing
earnings over a longer term. The next section discusses the importance and appropri-
ateness of corporate counsel's functions in this context.
67 In this regard, the conflicts problems in a close corporation tend to differ in
magnitude, rather than in type, from those in the public corporation. See generally MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, EC 5-18 (1980).
68 Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 520; Pierce, supra note 19, at 356.
69 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.1 and 2.2 (1984); Brown &
Dauer, supra note 15.
70 Brown & Brown, supra note 38, at 453-54. See Brown & Dauer, supra note 15;
Redlich, Should a Lawyer Cross the Murky Divide?, 31 Bus. LAw. 478 (1975).
71 The role of the lawyer contemplated here should make self-evident the reason I
do not treat Rule 2.2 of the MRPC ("lawyer as intermediary") as an adequate rule of
representation for these purposes.
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Two individuals (John and Sue) have decided to conduct a busi-
ness together and approach counsel with their plan. 72 Sue says to
counsel:
John and I want to form a corporation in which we will have equal
control. Each of us will invest equally, and expect to draw equal
salaries and share equally in the profits. John will be Vice Presi-
dent and I will be President. Please prepare the papers.
At this point, the Codes permit, and even encourage, the lawyer to
comply with Sue's request to prepare the papers. 73 Yet it is both
irresponsible and inconsistent with the clients' expectations for the
lawyer simply to comply with this mandate. The clients have ap-
proached a professional with a plan implicitly predicated upon legal
conclusions.74 It is both the lawyer's role and the clients' expecta-
tion that counsel will discuss with them the facts underlying those
conclusions, and re-examine those conclusions based upon the facts
adduced. 75 For example, it may turn out that John has investments
in a number of enterprises and really does not want to devote full
time to the business. In that case, Sue might wish to rethink their
agreement about equal salaries. Another possibility is that both par-
ties expect substantial losses to be generated by the business in its
early years. John, whose passive income from other sources is
equally substantial, might prefer a "subchapter S" corporation. 76
But if the corporation is structured that way, his total economic ben-
efit from an equal sharing arrangement will be greater than Sue's. 77
It might be to Sue's advantage to organize the business as a partner-
72 It is rare (and has never occurred in my experience) for clients to approach a
lawyer with either a complete plan of organization or a naked series of facts. See Brown
& Brown, supra note 36, at 458. Typically they will want to organize a business and have
had some, albeit incomplete, discussions among themselves as to the form the organiza-
tion will take, their relative roles in its operations, and their investments in it. Often
they will present the results of their discussions to the lawyer in a conclusory form. See
Braucher, Darrell, Herwitz & Malone, Business Planning and Professional Responsibility,
PRAC. LAW. 17 (Jan. 1962) [hereinafter Braucher] for a hypothetical situation highlight-
ing many of the same problems. Ethical guidance in this situation is not significantly
clearer today than it was in 1962.
73 Brown & Brown, supra note 38; Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 521-22.
74 Cf Wasserstrom, supra note 26, at 125 (clients unable to make decisions without
advice of counsel).
75 Redlich, supra note 68, at 479. But see Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 521-23
(MRPC discourages initiation by counsel).
76 Fundamentally, a "subchapter S" corporation is a corporation which is treated as
a partnership for tax purposes. Each shareholder is individually taxed on her pro rata
share of the corporation's profits and the corporation as an entity is not so taxed. I.R.C.
§§ 1361-1379 (1987).
For a good discussion of "S" corporations and the requirements for election to
become one, see F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 2.06, at 30-34.
77 John will have passive income against which to set off his losses from the corpo-
ration. Sue will not have such income and, therefore, will be unable to use those losses.
I.R.C. § 496 (1987).
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ship. But if it is so organized, John will be facing greater risk of
personal liability since Sue has relatively few personal assets (be-
yond those invested in the enterprise). 78 John may want to be able
to liquidate his interest in the corporation if a better investment op-
portunity arises. But Sue will be uncomfortable with the risk that his
buyer (Sue's new "partner") may be undesirable to her.
This colloquy could continue virtually ad infinitum. 79 The
problems are clear: To the extent that the lawyer acts as a mere
scrivener (if such a thing is possible or responsible) 0 and carries out
the parties' request, there will be no conflict in her sole representa-
tion of the corporation because she is not favoring either partici-
pant's interests over those of the other.8' But once she begins to
explore the facts, her role becomes that of an initiator, a planner,
and an advisor. She will be an initiator in that she will suggest eco-
nomic, legal, and practical considerations and possible courses of
action which have not been considered or fully appreciated by the
parties. She will be a planner in that she will lay out the organiza-
tional model and assist in establishing the allocation of rights and
responsibilities between the parties. And she will be an advisor in
that she will counsel each of the parties with respect to the course of
action which is likely to be most profitable to each of them based
upon their individual circumstances and desires. 82
She will do all of these things, that is, if she does what she is
trained to do and what the clients expect of her. For the lawyer is an
expert. She is an expert not only in her knowledge of the law but
also because, in the course of applying that knowledge in her prac-
tice and as a result of her experience, she will have counseled many
clients in similar circumstances. She will have knowledge and judg-
ment developed as a result of having been in the same situation
many times. Yet to John and Sue the situation that brings them to
78 Of course the parties are liable personally for the obligations of the partnership.
U.P.A. § 15 (1969).
79 See Haynsworth, supra note 8, at 459 (listing of additional considerations).
80 See Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 99 Idaho 662, 586 P.2d 1378 (1978) and
Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Ct. App. 1961) for the
proposition that a lawyer may act as a mere scrivener in drafting real estate contracts for
both buyer and seller. The court in In reJans, 295 Or. 289, 666 P.2d 830 (1983) distin-
guished both these cases in the close corporation context. I wish to note that I do not
believe that Beal and Blevin stand for the broad propositions described inJans. The facts
in at least the Blevin case indicate that counsel was jointly representing the parties in
circumstances in which it was appropriate. The Beal case, I believe, was, on this point,
wrongly decided. Aronson, supra note 30, at 826, suggests that it may be possible for a
lawyer to function solely as a scrivener. I disagree based on the reasoning presented in
the text.
81 Except perhaps to the extent she knows that the proposed form will be more
advantageous to one of the participants and remains silent.
82 Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 521-22; Redlich, supra note 70, at 479.
1989] 483
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the lawyer's door is extraordinary. 83 Therefore, they must rely on
counsel to guide them.
The implications of counsel's role as illustrated by this hypo-
thetical are not, of course, restricted to the choice of organizational
form. They arise repeatedly with respect to capital structure, corpo-
rate finance, control mechanisms, organic transactions, and every
similar decision that occurs during the life of the corporation. They
further highlight the deficiencies in the Codes. Each requires coun-
sel to pledge allegiance to the entity. However, as a matter of sub-
stantive law, there is virtually no entity interposed betweenJohn and
Sue. Each Code permits counsel to represent both if she can do so
without compromising the representation of either. However, it is
extremely difficult in my personal experience for counsel uncom-
promisingly to represent both John and Sue because their interests
conflict.8 4
This does not mean that counsel should never undertake such
representation. Reasons of economy and efficiency suggest that,
where possible, such representation is desirable.8 5 The hypotheti-
83 Perhaps somewhat less so forJohn than Sue, sinceJohn obviously has made simi-
lar investments. Query whetherJohn's greater sophistication should affect the lawyer's
role. See ifra note 105 and accompanying text. Cf Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482,
487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (shareholder in close corporation who had both legal and busi-
ness education and who drafted agreement between himself and the other shareholder
had greater fiduciary responsibility to treat other shareholder fairly because of his
greater sophistication).
84 See Ii re Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979). See also Aronson, supra
note 30, at 826 (lawyer may subconsciously favor one client over another). Cf Fried,
supra note 32, at 1076 (corporations are only formal arrangements through which indi-
viduals pursue their interests). I further suggest that it is irresponsible to leave the deci-
sion to John and Sue. See Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 523. Clients in this position
rarely will have the experience and sophistication to determine whether they will be
prejudiced by counsel's representation of competing interests. It is inconsistent with
professional self-regulation for us to ask our clients to make our hard choices for us. Cf
Brown & Dauer, supra note 15, at 523 (suggesting that the profession should not "leave
the definition of legal problems to its clients"); Pierce, supra note 2 1, at 359-60 (observ-
ing that the CPR's requirement of client consent for dual representation is illusory).
It may, however, seem unduly paternalistic to deny clients the right to consent to
joint representation notwithstanding conflict. An analysis of the concept of informed
consent is beyond the scope of this Article. However, where the lawyer's professional
judgment can be expected to be compromised notwithstanding such consent, it seems
reasonable to require her, in the circumstances discussed infra, to refuse to undertake
the representation. But see Developments in the Law, supra note 2 1.
85 See sources cited supra note 34. It has been suggested that joint representation
should be permitted in order to avoid the adversary element injected into negotiations
by the presence of several lawyers. The fear of conflict among participants at the plan-
ning stage can even lead to irresponsibility on the part of counsel. See Hetherington,
Special Characteristics, supra note 8, at 17 n.65 ("A prominent Wisconsin commercial law-
yer told the writer that when clients who come to him to form a closely held enterprise
are so concern[e]d about possible future disagreement that they want binding agree-
ments to resolve such difficulties in advance, he may advise them not to go into business
together."). This attitude is, without additional facts, nothing short of astonishing!
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cal suggests that the propriety of counsel's undertaking such repre-
sentation depends on the existence of factors suggesting inherent
conflict among the participants. 86 The CPR and MRPC throw the
balancing of these considerations back into the lawyer's lap. While
presuming that the lawyer will act in good faith and exercise her
best judgment,87 the Codes provide no guidelines for formulating a
judgment. s8 Judgments will vary and this variation will result in in-
consistent approaches and in an absence of standards other than
case-by-case good faith application of personal judgment.89
It should be possible to set clearer standards in order to de-
velop a more unified approach to these problems. 90 With this in
mind, I have developed a typology of close corporations to help de-
termine whether a pattern exists.
86 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text; infra note 113; infra notes 157-59
and accompanying text.
87 Cf Patterson, supra note 3, at 59 ("The ultimate issue in determining whether
rules of ethics are to be an integral part of the law is whether they serve as effective
guidelines for the good lawyer as well as a basis for disciplining the bad lawyer."); Wed-
dington, A Fresh Approach to Preservng Independent Judgment-Canon 6 of the Proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility, 11 ARIz. L. REV. 31, 34 (1969) (one reason for the existence of
ethics codes is to prevent lawyers from putting themselves in positions in which they
cannot properly function). Note, too, that a lawyer is a fiduciary to her client, and courts
have indicated that her role is analogous to that of a corporate director. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 comment (1983).
88 Cf Aronson, supra note 30, at 813 ("The key to preventing unintentional or un-
witting violations [of ethical norms] lies in anticipating the probability or possibility that
a conflict situation will develop.").
89 For varying approaches of lawyers to ethical dilemmas, see J. CARLIN, supra note
35.
Consistency for its own sake is not to be lauded. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 223, 259 (1967) (questioning the value of
consistency in the law); Emerson, Self-Reliance, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 263 (Gilman ed. 1965) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,
adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines." And, it might be added, law-
yers.). However, in the context of professional ethics, where few external constraints
exist (and where enforcement depends upon the identification of a breach, which is
made difficult by existing rules, particularly for unsophisticated clients), consistency has
the virtue of facilitating both compliance and professional self-regulation and insures
that clients will be treated equally.
90 "Lawyers do not view all potential conflicts of interest with equal trepidation."
Davis & Elliston, Conflict ofInterest, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 280 (M. Davis &
F. Elliston eds. 1986); Kipnis, supra note 34, at 287 ("If the potential for conflict of
interest is understood well enough by the attorney and the prospective clients, it may be
that agreement can be reached as to the attorney's obligations if events occur that would
ordinarily give rise to an actual conflict of obligations."); cf. Pierce, supra note 21, at 369
(it might be reasonable to define the lawyer's professional role in relation to his clients'
expectations); Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1338 (obtaining "meaningful con-
sent" to the joint representation of shareholders in a close corporation is a "realistic
possibility.").
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II
A TYPOLOGY OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS
The following typology, based upon reported cases, academic
commentary, and practical experience, classifies close corporations
as consisting of three types: the incorporated proprietorship; the
family corporation; and the incorporated partnership. While it can-
not pretend to exhaust (and I do not contend that it should exhaust)
the types of close corporations which actually exist or may be
formed, I believe that it does describe the most common types of
close corporations. 9' By examining the typology we can identify
various factors to suggest whether or not a particular corporate rep-
resentation should be undertaken (or continued) by counsel without
separate representation for some or all shareholders.
A. The Incorporated Proprietorship
The incorporated proprietorship 92 is, of course, the simplest
case. By this term I mean a corporation, all of the stock of which
(except perhaps for directors' qualifying shares)93 is legally and ben-
eficially owned by a single individual. The fact that directors and
officers other than the "proprietor" exist should be irrelevant.9 4
There is complete unity of interest in this model, for the ultimate
residual claimant of all of the corporation's income and assets will
be the single proprietor.9 5 However, at some point in the life of the
91 Empirical evidence in the field of close corporations is hard to come by. But see
Statutoy Needs of Close Corporations, supra note 8. Although some corporation statutes re-
quire close corporation status to be reflected in corporate charters, most do not. Id.
Furthermore, a charter is not particularly informative with respect to the number or
identity of the shareholders. Thus the cases are all that is available for analysis. I recog-
nize that this might result in a bias inherent in the typology since the reported cases will
be those in which conflict materialized. For this reason I explicitly discuss some cases in
which counsel's conduct was not in question.
92 The terminology is derivative. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 39; Israels,
supra note 8; Comment, supra note 8, at 138.
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(b) (1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-33 (Supp. 1987).
94 For purposes of discussion and analysis I have ignored the legitimate concern of
courts for the interests of third party creditors and other corporate constituents. At
various stages in the development of corporate law and in a variety of circumstances the
interests of third parties have led courts to restrict the extent to which the actions of a
shareholder can supercede or be substituted for those of the nonshareholder directors.
See, e.g., Somers v. AAA Temporary Servs., Inc., 5 Ill. App. 3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462
(1977); Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
supra note 12, at 150-92.
95 But see Parker v. Frazier (In re Freedom Solar Center, Inc.), 42 Bankr. 261 (1984)
(holding that in the case of an incorporated proprietorship in Chapter 7 proceedings the
interests of the debtor corporation and its sole shareholder were not congruent where
the sole shareholder formed a new corporation to acquire the assets of the debtor).
Analysis of these issues in light of the rich economic literature which examines the ques-
tion of the identity of the residual owner of the corporation is beyond the scope of this
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corporation additional shareholders may appear (through gift or in-
testacy, through sale of a portion of the proprietor's interest, or
through sale by the corporation of newly issued shares.) When this
occurs, counsel must reevaluate her representation of the corpora-
tion (assuming the new shareholders are not otherwise represented)
under one of the other relevant models.
B. The Family Corporation
The family corporation consists of two sub-types: 1) a corpora-
tion which begins as an incorporated proprietorship and in which all
shareholders are members of the same family, receiving their stock
from the sole stockholder (hereinafter referred to as a "true family
corporation") 6 and 2) a corporation in which all shareholders are
members of the same extended family (hereinafter referred to as a
"family incorporated partnership"). As explained below, the family
incorporated partnership is only superficially a family corporation
and therefore is classified and analyzed as an incorporated
partnership.
Professor O'Neal describes a source of dissension in true family
corporations which, although similar to behavior in family incorpo-
rated partnerships and incorporated partnerships, reflects different
motives.
Sometimes all of the shareholders are descendants of the original
founder, and the founder may have directed by will or otherwise that the
business be used for the continued support of the family. This outlook
leads to the use of corporate assets by members of the family,
loans to members of the family without interest, intermingling of
corporate and individual money and assets, payment of compen-
sation to officers without formal board authorization, and a gen-
Article. See, e.g., POSNER & ScoTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES
REGULATION (1980); Fama &Jensen, supra note 8. Instead I have followed the traditional
legal model which acknowledges the shareholders as the exclusive residual owners.
96 The term "family corporation" is frequently used by commentators. See, e.g., H.
HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at § 258; F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8,
§ 1.05, at 11.
The close corporation, all of the stock of which is owned by a wife and husband, is
not separately addressed here. Such a corporation surely will be a true family corpora-
tion under the reasoning set forth in this Article (and under a traditional view of the
marital relationship), at least while the marriage is stable. If the marriage deteriorates,
and certainly if separation or divorce occurs, the corporate stock may become marital
property under the laws of the relevant state. This issue, while similar in kind to that
presented in the context of the true family corporation, see infra notes 121-39 and accom-
panying text, will be different in degree because an actual conflict will exist with regard
to the distribution of the founder's wealth. The rules governing multiple representation
in these contexts is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Woods v. Superior Court,
149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983); In re Brandsness, 299 Or. 420, 702
P.2d 1098 (1985); In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978).
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eral failure to observe the separate entity of the corporation and
the formalities of corporate action. This lax handling of the enter-
prise's affairs sets the stage for dissension. 9 7
The mere creation of a true family corporation does not signal
the likelihood of potential conflicts which make joint representation
of the shareholders inappropriate. The true family corporation
evolves from the incorporated proprietor in which, as I have already
argued, no ethical problems exist for counsel.98 The potential for
problems only develops as the stock is distributed among family
members. At various points, counsel may have to advise the
founder about the distribution of control and earnings to take place
when he retires or after his death. This may put counsel in the
midst of conflict with those who will become the corporation's own-
ers, as well as with family members who already are shareholders
and who will expect to maintain, if not improve, their status within
the corporation in relation to other family members. 99 In particular,
those family members who are active in the business will expect a
greater return on their investment than those who are not.' 00 The
question facing the lawyer in this situation generally will not be
whether initially to accept the representation but at what point in
the evolution of the corporation to choose her client from among
the shareholders and recommend separate representation to the
other constituents. 01
On closer examination, however, these potential conflicts di-
minish in significance. That is because the distribution of corporate
ownership in a true family corporation has little to do with risk di-
versification or acquisition of managerial talent. It has to do with
the transmission of wealth. Therefore, the founder will not consult
97 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
2:10 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d
193 (1983).
98 Similarly, no problems should exist where the true family corporation originates
with several family members holding stock as long as the corporation is the alter ego of
the founder. See In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978).
99 See, e.g., Hoiles v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 204 Cal. Rptr. 11
(1984).
100 The solution may not always be as simple as payment of salaries, for occasionally
the "working shareholders" will resent those they believe are profiting from their labors.
This resentment may itself lead to conflict.
I01 Cf B. WUNNICKE, ETHICS COMPLIANCE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 235 (1987) (lawyer
for fictional close corporation should not represent any faction in the dispute); Gold-
stein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975) (lawyer for corporation is
not permitted to take sides in a contest for corporate control); In re Bristow, 301 Or.
194, 204, 721 P.2d 437,442 (1986) (when the interests ofjoint clients diverge, "the only
ethical position for an attorney to adopt ... is to represent neither [interest]" (quoting
In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 475, 584 P.2d 284, 292 (1978)); Braucher, supra note 71. See
also MRPC Rule 1.16 (with respect to terminating representation).
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with counsel regarding whom the appropriate beneficiaries should
be, but rather what the best method will be for achieving his wealth
transmission goals. Any disagreement the new shareholders have
with respect to such wealth transmission will be with the founder in
his allocation of stock, and not with counsel who effected that
allocation.
The family incorporated partnership presents a set of consider-
ations different from that presented by the true family corporation.
This type of family corporation, founded by brothers or sisters,
brothers- or sisters-in-law, or other relatives, is formed initially by
multiple shareholders, whose purpose is not to distribute their per-
sonal wealth throughout the extended family, but rather to diversify
risk or acquire management. They know each other because they
are related but they do business with each other for business rea-
sons. Thus the family incorporated partnership is more closely
analogous to the incorporated partnership.
C. The Incorporated Partnership
The incorporated partnership' 0 2 can be created in a number of
ways. It can evolve from an incorporated proprietorship where the
owner either has sold a portion of his holdings outside the family to
achieve personal liquidity (for retirement, diversification, or other
reasons) or where he has caused the corporation to raise additional
capital through the sale of newly issued shares. 103 An incorporated
partnership also can be created by friends or family members (and
thus includes the family incorporated partnership)' 04 or by people
previously unacquainted (and sometimes introduced by the law-
yer).' 0 5 In this model, there will likely be several shareholders who
may initially have, or may come to have, conflicting interests.106
There is a crucial distinction between the incorporated partner-
ship and the true family corporation. Participants in an incorpo-
rated partnership become shareholders either because of special
expertise or invested capital; that is, they increase the productivity
of the business or diversify the risks attendant upon its formation
102 As to terminology, see sources cited supra note 92.
103 Other ethical considerations may arise where other forms of finance, such as op-
tions, warrants, etc, are used. A discussion of these is beyond the scope of this Article.
104 Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 695 P.2d 906 (1985) (corporation formed by
two friends and the father of one of them); Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222
A.2d 800 (1966) (corporation formed by two families). Where substantial or controlling
ownership of a corporation is owned by the members of a family, counsel should analyze
the propriety of representing all of the shareholder-family members in the same way she
would analyze the propriety of representing all of the shareholders.
105 See, e.g., DelaMaria v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 612 F. Supp. 1507
(N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979).
106 See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8.
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and operation. 10 7 Participants in a true family corporation, on the
other hand, become shareholders primarily because of their rela-
tionship to the founder, rather than because of any abilities, talents,
or capital they may be able to contribute.10 8 As will be seen, this
observation suggests a different approach to evaluating the propri-
ety of multiple representation.
Several distinctions among incorporated partnerships may have
an impact on the propriety of joint representation:
(1) A distinction exists between a situation where the par-
ties have previously been acquainted' 0 9 and one where counsel in-
troduces the parties."10
(2) A further distinction might be drawn between a case
in which all parties had been clients of the same counsel for some
time"' and where one of the parties is a relatively new client." 12
(3) A third distinction is based upon the nature of the
participants, as where a corporation is formed by an entrepreneur
and a venture capital fund or a sophisticated independent investor
(John, in my earlier hypothetical). 1 3 This might also include an-
other subtype of close corporation created by the privatization of a
public corporation through a management leveraged buy-out."14
Counsel may have to consider many additional factors when de-
termining the propriety of her undertaking multiple representation.
These factors include how well the parties know one another, how
well counsel knows each of the parties, and whether the nature and
experience of one or more of the parties is sufficient to signal, at the
outset, clear goals intrinsic to the participant." 15 In my evaluation,
however, none of these distinctions or factors is of independent or
controlling significance. The factor which I believe to be determina-
107 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59; cf. Fama &Jensen, supra note 8, at 306; Torres v.
Divis, 144 Ill. App. 3d 958, 494 N.E.2d 1227 (1986).
108 See generally STERN, INSIDE THE FAMILY-HELD BUSINESS (1986).
109 See, e.g., White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
1 10 See, e.g., DeLaMaria v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 612 F. Supp. 1507
(N.D. Ga. 1985); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977); In re
Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979).
11 See, e.g., Brownstein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655.
112 See, e.g., DeLaMaria, 612 F. Supp. 1507.
113 Note that representation of a syndicate of venture capital funds formed for the
purpose of making a portfolio investment presents different problems which are beyond
the scope of this Article. Halloran, Some Aspects of Representation of the Investor Groups in a
Venture Capital Financing, in M. HALLORAN, L. BENTON & J. LovEjov, VENTURE CAPITAL
AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 479 (1984). Furthermore, corporations financed in
this manner may depart significantly from the typical close corporation model. See Fama
&Jensen, supra note 8, at 306 n.9 ("The analysis predicts that when venture capital is put
into small entrepreneurial organizations by outsiders, mechanisms for separating the
management and control of important decisions are initiated.").
114 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1.08, at 32.
115 These factors have been noted by others. See, e.g., Haynsworth, supra note 8.
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tive of whether multiple representation of the shareholders of an
incorporated partnership should be undertaken in a specific case is
whether the shareholders, individually or in cohesive groups, have relatively
equal equity interests and voting power in the corporation. As will be dis-
cussed, it is only in such a case (barring other obvious conflicts) that
multiple representation should not be undertaken." 16
It is important to emphasize that the type or subtype of the
close corporation may vary during the life of the corporation." 7
Each change of corporate type (or indeed each discussion counsel
holds with the participants about prospective changes in corporate
type) should lead counsel, assuming she has undertaken sole repre-
sentation both of the entity and the aggregate, to reevaluate her
role. 118
III
APPLYING THE TYPOLOGY TO THE CASES
The conflicts of interest among shareholders inherent in the
close corporation models presented in the typology become appar-
ent when examining some cases. I will first set out the facts of the
cases and then discuss them together. Each case presents an illus-
tration of how close corporation counsel can be caught between the
competing interests of shareholders. In several of the cases coun-
sel's conduct is not addressed. In discussing these, I treat counsel's
conduct as if it were in issue and analyze the question of whether
1 16 Cf S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 13, at 13 ("When the corporation is owned in equal
shares by the organizers and conducts the business they contemplated from the outset,
no purpose would be served by treating the two organizations as distinct and subjecting
the attorney to narrow conflicts restrictions."); Hetherington, Special Characteristics, supra
note 8; Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1346 (counsel may generally assume that
management, even if allied or congruent with controlling shareholders, speaks for the
corporation). See also infra note 154 and accompanying text. Professor Hetherington's
position will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
117 F. O'NEAL & R. THoMPSON, supra note 8, § 2.03, at 5-6; G. HAZARD, supra note 6,
at 75-76. Cf Hazard, supra note 33, at 35-36 ("One problem in thinking through the
lawyer's responsibilities in triangular relationships is that the relationship may not be
continuously triangular.").
118 A last type of close corporation to be mentioned is the partially-owned subsidiary
corporation. This can come into being when the parent wishes to establish a new line of
business in, or to hive-off an existing line of business into, another corporation for busi-
ness or tax reasons. It can also come into being when the parent makes a substantial
equity investment in an existing corporation. Counsel facing this situation has four po-
tentially competing clients or categories of clients (assuming the parent is closely held):
the shareholders of the closely-held parent, the parent qua entity (which includes the
parent as shareholder of the subsidiary), the minority shareholders of the subsidiary,
and the subsidiary qua entity. This type of close corporation will not be discussed sepa-
rately both because of its own complexities and because of the possibility of drawing
analogies from the ethical responses posed with respect to the incorporated partnership.
Obviously, the ethical duties of counsel to the wholly-owned subsidiary can be analyzed
under the incorporated proprietorship model.
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counsel should have recognized the conflict to begin with; that is,
whether the nature of the corporation should have signalled that if
conflict occurred, counsel would be sufficiently compromised that
she should not have undertaken or continued the multiple represen-
tation.'1 9 Other cases deal directly with the conduct of counsel in
the circumstances presented.120 With respect to these, I will discuss
the correctness of the judicial response and the appropriateness of
the standards applied.
A. The Family Corporation
Meiselman v. Meiselman 12 1 presents the problems of the true fam-
ily corporation in its clearest form. H.B. Meiselman, an Austrian
immigrant, developed a highly successful chain of movie theaters
and made a number of profitable real estate investments. These
were owned by eight corporations, all wholly-owned by Meiselman,
the largest of which appears to have been Eastern Federal
Corporation.
During his lifetime, H.B. Meiselman began to transfer stock in
the corporations to his two sons, Michael and Ira. The stock gener-
119 It will be assumed in these cases, unless otherwise indicated, that none of the
corporation's shareholders were represented by counsel independently of the entity.
120 Many of the cases deal with motions to disqualify counsel in litigation against a
former officer, director, or shareholder of the corporation. See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Victorian
House, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Il1. 1982); Wayland v. Shore Lobster & Shrimp
Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Woods v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d
931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983); Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., 218 Cal. App. 2d 24, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (1963); Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956); Terre du
Lac Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Shrum, 661 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lowder
v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983). One court has observed that
disqualification motions and disciplinary proceedings under the Codes, while distin-
guishable, have been merged in concept by the courts. Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 640 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1986). But see Cannon v. U.S.
Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ("[a] motion to disqualify calls to
question not only the probity of the individual lawyer, but the legal profession as a
whole."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976). In treating disqualifi-
cation motions as involving similar, although less stringent, considerations as discipli-
nary proceedings, I am accepting the reasoning of the court in Original Appalachian
Artworks. The fact that some of these decisions have dealt with a conflict situation occur-
ring where counsel has represented the corporation or its shareholders against afoner
officer, director, or shareholder, see, e.g., Bobbilt, 545 F. Supp. 1124; Wayland, 537 F.
Supp. 1220; Mleehan, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, is not a relevant distinction, since the issue
inevitably is whether the corporation's (or shareholders') counsel also represented the
former officer, director, or shareholder at the time he was connected with the corporation.
Other decisions have dealt with the question of whether corporate counsel could
represent any of the parties in a derivative suit. Jacuzzi, 218 Cal. App. 2d 24, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 188; In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983); Schmidt v. Magnetic Head
Corp., 101 A.D.2d 268, 476 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1984).
121 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). The fact that in this case the parties re-
tained separate counsel at the time of the litigation, id. at 284, 307 S.E.2d at 555, is
unimportant for purposes of discussing whether separate counsel was ethically required.
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ally was distributed equally except that Michael received only about
2.5% of the stock in Eastern Federal and Ira received the balance. 122
The result was that Michael owned approximately 43% of the con-
solidated family business (29.8% of which consisted of his stock in
Eastern Federal), with Ira owning the balance. Both Michael and Ira
were employed by the corporations.
Controversy arose over the ownership of Republic Manage-
ment Corporation, a corporation formed during H.B. Meiselman's
lifetime as the successor to several other corporations which pro-
vided management services to the Meiselman family theaters.
Although Ira had not owned all of the stock in the predecessors, he
was, at the time of the suit, the sole owner of Republic. Republic
and Eastern entered into a management contract pursuant to which
Eastern agreed to pay Republic 5.5% of its theater admission and
concession sales, which was a substantial amount of money. Michael
sued Ira alleging that Ira breached his fiduciary duty to the family
corporations and seeking recovery by those corporations of Repub-
lic's profit. In addition, he sued Ira under North Carolina's corpora-
tion law for dissolution of the corporations or other equitable relief
on the statutory grounds that such relief was reasonably necessary
to protect Michael's rights and interests. Ultimately, Michael re-
quested that he be bought out of the corporations at fair value.' 23
In re Radom & Niedorff124 illustrates a problem arising in the
family corporation of the extended family type, or the family incor-
porated partnership. Henry Niedorff and his brother-in-law David
Radom owned all the stock of Radom & Niedorff, Inc. Upon
Henry's death his stock devolved to his wife, Anna Niedorff (nee
Radom, David's sister). David and Anna did not particularly like
one another, and shortly after Anna acquired her shares David
brought a proceeding for dissolution of the corporation. David
(who was president of the corporation) alleged that Anna had been
uncooperative with him, had refused to sign his salary checks, and
had otherwise caused him countless problems in the operation of
122 Why this was so is not entirely clear from the opinion. There is evidence that the
relationship between Michael and his father was characterized by occasional conflict. Id.
at 285, 307 S.E.2d at 556. Furthermore, Michael was unmarried while Ira was married
and had two children. Their father's concern that Michael might not marry a Jewish
woman, id. at 282, 287, 307 S.E.2d at 553, 556, and Ira's greater number of dependents,
appear to have been a factors in their father's decision. Another reason might have been
that H. B. Meiselman thought Ira was more competent to control the business. But no
further evidence is presented to sustain these speculations.
123 Id. at 285, 307 S.E.2d at 556. In response to Michael's suit, Ira fired him as an
employee of the corporations and terminated his employee fringe benefits. Id. at 283,
307 S.E.2d at 554.
124 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954). This case involved the propriety of dissolu-
tion in a deadlock situation.
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the business. In addition, he alleged (as grounds for dissolution)
that election of directors was impossible because of Anna's refusal
to cooperate.
A further example of problems in the family incorporated part-
nership is provide by Galler v. Galler.' 25 Two brothers, Benjamin
and Isadore Galler, incorporated a partnership equally owned by
them. They became equal shareholders in the new corporation.
Thirty years after the corporation was formed (and 35 years after
the partnership was formed), they agreed, on their accountant's ad-
vice, to enter into an agreement to ensure financial benefits to their
immediate families and continued equal control of the corporation
by their respective families on their deaths. The undisputed evi-
dence showed that Isadore had, from the inception of the new
agreement, no intention of complying with it.126 Benjamin died,
and Isadore, in fact, did not comply with the agreement, using his
control (both practical, since Benjamin was no longer employed in
the business, and dejure)127 to deny Benjamin's widow, Emma, any
financial benefits from her stock ownership.
Although the opinions in these cases do not discuss the role of
counsel (nor do the opinions indicate whether the parties and the
entity were separately represented in corporate matters), they pro-
vide an instructive opportunity to examine whether counsel should
have undertaken multiple representation of the shareholders.
It should first be noted that in each case, under the Codes, it
probably would have been within the bounds of ethical propriety for
one lawyer initially to represent the entity (and thus indirectly its
shareholders.)128 In the cases of Radom & Niedorff and Gal/er, the
lawyer should have declined multiple representation in the first in-
stance. This is because, as discussed below, each of these cases in-
volved close corporations of the incorporated partnership type in
which the parties had equal ownership. Meiselman, however, in-
volved a true family corporation. In that case, the lawyer could have
undertaken the initial representation because of the presence of a
plan of wealth distribution, but should have required the retention
of separate counsel for each of the shareholders as soon as their
125 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). This case involved the propriety of a con-
trolling shareholder depriving a minority shareholder of salary, notwithstanding the
existence of an agreement requiring such payments.
126 Id. at 18, 203 N.E.2d at 580.
127 Isadore's dejure control came about by his purchase of stock from an employee of
the corporation, which stock had been issued to the employee during Benjamin's life-
time. One of the remedies demanded by Emma was the right to buy apro rata portion of
those shares.
128 In effect at the time of Radom & Niedorff and Galler were the American Bar Associ-
ation's Canons of Ethics. Since these are no longer in effect in any jurisdiction, they are
not evaluated here.
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ownership of any of the entities began to diverge from that initial
plan. 129
Both Galler and Radom & Niedorf involved separate, though re-
lated, families. It should have been perceived at the outset that po-
tential problems could arise. In each case the situation should have
been analyzed as a representation of unrelated parties. Galler and
Radom & Niedorf are similar in that, although the shareholders were
related, their co-ownership of the business presumably did not arise
as a result of their desire to share their individual wealth, but rather
as a means of allocating responsibility and risk. Thus the goals of
each shareholder would be individual wealth maximization, which
would lead to a sharing of corporate wealth only to the extent neces-
sary to achieve this diversification.
Meiselman, however, is different. In Meiselman, the brothers'
share ownership came about not as a result of their father's desire to
attract new talent, diversify his risk, or raise additional capital, but as
a means of distributing his wealth.'30 The brothers became business
"partners" because each of them received an interest in their late
father's business by gift and inheritance. Instead of liquidating the
business during his lifetime and leaving his sons cash, he left them a
capital asset together with the means for continuing their liveli-
hood.' 3 1 Seen in this light, counsel's representation of the share-
holders relates to maintenance of the distribution of wealth
129 Although it is reasonably clear that upon the occurrence of such conflict counsel
should decline to represent either (or any) of the shareholders, B. WUNNICKE, supra note
101, there seems to be no reason why such counsel could not continue to represent the
"entity" in its business dealings with third parties. Indeed, the same reasoning which
compels the conclusion that counsel should not represent any dissenting faction argues
strongly in favor of representation of the corporation by independent counsel in such
dealings. Resignation of counsel from the representation of any of the shareholders
eliminates the problems generated by acquisition of confidential information during the
earlier course of her representation of the corporation and its shareholders. However, if
counsel continues to represent the corporation in its external business dealings, the cor-
poration will avoid losses resulting from the disappearance of counsel intimately familiar
wih the corporation's affairs.
130 The concurring opinion of Judge Martin in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.
279, 313, 315, 307 S.E.2d 551, 571, 573 (1983), clearly recognizes the importance of
this fact although it does not fully appreciate its implication with respect to the parties'
legitimate expectations. The opinion ofJudge Freye, id. at 281, 290, 293, 307 S.E.2d at
553, 558, 559, comes closer to appreciating these implications. Cf Cressy v. Shannon
Continental Corp., 177 Ind. App. 224, 228, 378 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1978) (with regard to
parties' intent and expectations.
131 Cf In re Estate of Riefberg, 58 N.Y.2d 134, 142, 446 N.E.2d 424, 428, 459
N.Y.S.2d 739, 743 (1983) (holding that buy-sell agreement between shareholders of
close corporation requiring corporation to purchase shareholder's shares from his wis-
dom was "testamentary substitute"); Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 643, 197
S.W. 376, 379-80 (1917) (since term of will dictating management and distribution of
corporation had expired, the will "afford[s] no legal standard in determining the rights
of [the founder-testator's] children to their property.").
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intended by the father. Thus, counsel can be guided by a standard,
external to the particular conflict, which defines the scope of the
brothers' fiduciary duties to one another. As a result, the brothers'
fiduciary obligations to one another, and the ethical duty of counsel
to each of them, becomes clear: it is to maintain the distribution of
wealth intended by the father. 32 The problem is as old as the story
of Jacob and Esau, but counsel can be guided without divine inter-
vention. As long as none of the shareholders contributes additional
capital to the business or provides disproportionate services,1 33 con-
sistency with the family plan requires proportionate sharing in the
corporation's wealth. Put differently, the fiduciary duty of one
shareholder to another is determined by the plan of wealth distribu-
tion, which establishes the proper allocation of corporate wealth to
each of the parties in accordance with their reasonable
expectations. 34
Seen in this light, the true family corporation presents no over-
whelming ethical problems for counsel. The plan of control and the
balance of corporate wealth is mandated not by agreement or inten-
tion of the parties but by the founder's plan for distributing
132 Cf. O'Neal, supra note 11, recommending this general approach in the substan-
tive context of determining the scope of shareholders' fiduciary duties:
The reasonable expectations of the shareholders, as they exist at the in-
ception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter through a course
of dealing concurred in by all of them, is perhaps the most reliable guide
to a just solution of a dispute among shareholders, at least a dispute
among shareholders in the typical close corporation.
Id. at 886. See also Chittur, supra note 8, at 170; Hetherington, Special Characteristics, supra
note 8, at 38 n.25; In re Kemp & Beatley, 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484
N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984) (holding that use of shareholders' "reasonable expectations"
in defining oppressive conduct under statute permitting dissolution of corporation for
oppressive conduct is appropriate.); cf. S. FiTZGIBBON, supra note 13, at I I (charter and
by-laws direct lawyers as to how to act for corporate constituents). The presence in the
context under discussion of a relatively unambiguous mechanism enabling counsel to
determine the proper outcome of a potential disagreement among shareholders simi-
larly is helpful in deciding whether counsel responsibly can discharge his duties to each
client. Of course, if one "beneficiary shareholder" explicitly seeks to upset this arrange-
ment, counsel may well be required to resign the multiple representation. See supra
notes 30-38.
133 These disparities can be dealt with by creating nonvoting securities with a fixed
return (which may or may not, depending upon a variety of factors, participate in the
residual equity) and paying salaries (pursuant to binding employment agreements) rea-
sonably related to the services performed.
134 This concept is hardly radical. It follows logically from the understanding, ex-
pressed in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 297, 307 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1983), that
the fiduciary duty of shareholders is a flexible concept defined in particular cases by the
shareholders' expectations. Cf O'Neal, supra note 11. When applied to the analysis of
counsel's ethical duties, it demonstrates that counsel will not be required to choose sides
between the parties, at least in a manner inconsistent with their own duties and
expectations.
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wealth.13 5 Moreover, this factor should not change from one gener-
ation to the next; that is, as each of the legatees effects his own plan
of wealth distribution. The proportion of corporate wealth due
each of the shareholders at any point in time can be determined by
tracing through the plan of distribution to the original
shareholders.13 6
This is not to suggest that unpleasant and very real internecine
conflicts will not develop. Nor does it suggest that the amount of
control over the business of the corporation cannot be allocated
more heavily in favor of those who are involved in operating the
business, or be altered to reflect actual changes in circumstances
over time. What it does suggest is that, despite such control, coun-
sel has relatively clear direction as to the proportionate balance of
corporate wealth which should nevertheless be maintained.' 37
Thus, it does not appear improper for her initially to undertake mul-
tiple representation of the corporation's shareholders. Of course,
when conflict becomes tangible she may have to resign the multiple
representation, because at that point independence ofjudgment on
behalf of each shareholder client may be impossible.' 38
It is this factor, the origination of the entity with a single ances-
tor of the shareholders (which is present in Meiselman, but not in
Radom & Niedorf and Galler), which suggests that counsel may have
sufficient external guidance to undertake and continue the represen-
tation of the corporation and its shareholders. The family incorpo-
rated partnership, however, appears on analysis to be strikingly
similar to the incorporated partnership save for the fact that the
shareholders have some relation to one another. A true family cor-
poration may evolve into a family incorporated partnership or an
135 At this point it becomes clear that the family corporation is distinctive because
the participants are involved primarily because of their relationship to the founder
rather than because of their special skills or ability to diversify risk.
136 It should be noted that shareholders in an incorporated partnership who have
clearly expressed to each other and to counsel the desire to maintain a specific distribu-
tion of corporate wealth could appear to be in the same position as the shareholders of a
true family corporation. There may be a significant difference, however, in that in the
incorporated partnership situation the shareholders will have made an affirmative deci-
sion to invest in the corporation rather than, in effect, being given the corporation be-
cause of their filial status. It is reasonable in the former case to protect the parties'
presumed rights to change their minds or reflect changing circumstances (recognizing,
of course, liability for breaches of contract). Consequently, counsel should treat such a
corporation under the incorporated partnership model notwithstanding such expressed
desires. The proposed rule makes no exception for such a situation.
137 Salaries paid to those involved in running the business could become an issue.
To the extent that shareholder-employees prefer a greater proportion of their share of
the wealth to be distributed in salary, capital structure could be adjusted to account for
this.
138 Counsel's duties upon resignation are beyond the scope of this Article. But see
supra note 129.
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incorporated partnership. Rarely can a business continue growth
and increase profitability without the infusion of external capital and
fresh managerial talent.'3 9 Whether a close corporation is a true
family corporation or a family incorporated partnership will be de-
termined at the time counsel is asked to undertake the representa-
tion. If the corporation is a family incorporated partnership,
counsel's representation should be analyzed under the incorporated
partnership model.
B. The Incorporated Partnership
Cases involving the incorporated partnership are similarly in-
structive. After examining one case in which the lawyer's conduct
was not in question (but should have been), I will discuss several
cases dealing specifically with lawyers' conduct. I conclude that
multiple representation of the shareholders of an incorporated part-
nership may be undertaken in any case other than one in which
share ownership is equal.
The first example is the famous case of Lehrman v. Cohen. 140 N.
M. Cohen and Samuel Lehrman incorporated their business, Giant
Food, Inc. The corporation was capitalized with two classes of com-
mon stock, Class AC stock (owned by the Cohen family) and Class
AL stock (owned by the Lehrman family). Each class had the right
to elect two of the corporation's four directors.
After Samuel's death, and as a result of disputes among the
Lehrman heirs, the Lehrman and Cohen families arranged to con-
solidate all of the Lehrman family holdings in Samuel's son, Jacob.
Because of the possibility of deadlock resulting from equal share-
holdings and equal directorships, the two sides agreed to a fifth di-
rectorship. The corporation issued a third class of common stock,
Class AD stock, to Joseph Danzansky, who had been counsel to the
company for the preceding five years. The Class AD stock carried
the right to elect one director, but lacked equity participation. Fif-
teen years later, at a meeting of the stockholders, the Class AC and
AD stock, over the objection of the Class AL stock, was voted in
favor of making Danzansky president of the company, succeeding N.
M. Cohen, with a fifteen year employment contract and a high
salary. '41
139 I am assuming that unrelated executive management of a close corporation will
require some compensation in the form of equity. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16,
17-18, 203 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1964) (issuance of shares to Rosenberg).
140 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966).
141 Danzansky's personal conflict of interest in becoming the highly paid and well
tenured president of his client is obvious and merits its own diatribe. The reader is
spared, however, for the issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Two other cases, dealing expressly with counsel's conduct,
highlight similar problems. DeLaMaria v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &
Murphy142 was a malpractice suit brought against the defendant law
firm and one of its members, John Gornall. DeLaMaria had retained
Gornall to help him move a jewelry business from Spain to Atlanta.
Apparently at DeLaMaria's request, Gornall recommended to him
as a business partner one Hayes who had been a client of Powell,
Goldstein. DeLaMaria and Hayes, after agreeing to become equal
shareholders in a new corporation organized to own and operate
the business, asked Gornall to prepare the corporate papers includ-
ing "incorporation documents" (presumably including a charter
and by-laws), an employment agreement for DeLaMaria and a share-
holders' agreement. Subsequently, Hayes volunteered to make an
additional contribution to the corporation in the form of a loan, the
documentation for which was, at the parties' request, prepared by
Gornall. 143
The corporation did poorly. At a board meeting attended by
Gornall, Hayes told DeLaMaria that he would refuse to fund his sal-
ary, but that he could continue to work for the corporation on a
commission basis. DeLaMaria refused, Hayes left the meeting and
Gornall advised DeLaMaria that he would have to seek new counsel.
The court found Gornall deficient in his representation of De-
LaMaria in a number of significant respects. 144 However, because
this was a malpractice case concerned solely with the care with which
Gornall represented DeLaMaria, it did not address the more inter-
esting ethical issue of whether Gornall should have undertaken this
multiple representation in the first instance.
A similar case, but one in the nature of a disciplinary hearing, is
In re Brownstein.145 In Brownstein, Woods, his father and a friend
asked Brownstein to organize a corporation in which Woods and his
father would each own 35% and a friend would own 30%. Brown-
stein continued as corporate counsel. As the corporation began to
fail, Brownstein introduced Woods to Whitcomb, another of Brown-
stein's clients who had previously invested in small speculative busi-
nesses. Subsequently, Whitcomb agreed to lend money to the
corporation and to purchase stock therein. The corporation contin-
ued to fail, Brownstein was terminated as corporate counsel, and the
corporation defaulted on Whitcomb's loan. Ultimately, Brownstein
represented Whitcomb in an action to collect the loan.
142 612 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
143 Id. at 1509.
144 Defendants were not held liable to plaintiff, however, since the court could not
find Gornall's poor advice to have proximately caused plaintiff's loss.
145 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979).
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The court, struck by the fact that Brownstein neither identified
who he was representing during the initial negotiations, nor indi-
cated any conflicts which might have existed, laid down the follow-
ing broad rule for counsel representing a close corporation:
Where a small, closely held corporation is involved, and in the
absence of a clear understanding with the corporate movers that
the attorney represents solely the corporation and not their indi-
vidual interests, it is improper for the attorney thereafter to repre-
sent a third party whose interests are adverse to those of the
stockholders and which arise out of a transaction which the attor-
ney handled for the corporation.... In actuality, the attorney in such
a situation represents the corporate owners in their individual capacities as
well as the corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made. 146
This conclusion does not derive from a reading of the Codes nor is
it consistently articulated by the courts. I believe, however, that it
derives from an appreciation of the substantive law of close corpora-
tions 147 and that it is correct. The inconsistency of this decision
with others highlights the need for articulated standards. 48 The
146 Id. at 87, 602 P.2d at 657 (emphasis added). See also In re Bristow, 301 Or. 194,
721 P.2d 437 (1986); In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978); Parker v. Frazier (In
re Freedom Solar Center, Inc.), 42 Bankr. 261 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984); cases cited supra
notes 5 and 7. But see In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983).
147 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
148 See cases cited supra note 7. The Oregon Supreme Court is the only court which
appears to have analyzed systematically the ethical problems of corporate representation
in a close corporation. The seminal case is In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284
(1978). Banks involved a corporation, United Medical Laboratories (UML), owned by
Michel, his wife and his two daughters, who together comprised its board of directors.
"However, Michel was a completely dominating force and ran the business as his private
fief." Id. at 461, 584 P.2d at 285. Banks and Thompson, through a law firm in which
they were partners, represented the corporation and also performed legal services for
individual members of the Michel family. Thompson as part of his duties prepared an
employment agreement between Michel and the corporation. "Because of the identity
of interests, corporate and private, all legal services were billed to the corporation re-
gardless of whether the work performed was corporate or private." Id. Although ini-
tially successful, the business began to develop serious financial problems. The Michel's
home life also deteriorated, with Michel at various times physically assaulting his wife
and one of his daughters. Mrs. Michel and her daughters consulted independent coun-
sel, and also consulted Thompson and Banks (although Thompson continued to counsel
Michel as chief executive officer of UML). Mrs. Michel and her daughters organized a
voting trust through which they obtained control of the board. Subsequently, Thomp-
son informed Michel that he could no longer represent him. Banks then delivered an
opinion to the board that Michel had violated his employment agreement. Finally, after
Michel terminated Banks' law firm as counsel for the corporation, Banks and Thompson
became stockholders (and Thompson a director) of a competing corporation formed by
former employees of UML. The founders requested (and Banks rendered) an opinion
regarding the enforceability of the non-competition contracts with UML which Banks'
firm had drafted as counsel to UML. The disciplinary proceeding followed.
The court, while recognizing the general rule that counsel to a corporation repre-
sents "the entity," id. at 469, 584 P.2d at 289-90, found significant the fact that UML was
a "family corporation." Id. Raising as a question of first impression the issue of whether
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question is whether counsel should ever find herself in this position.
Before proceeding to an analysis of these cases in light of the
the entity theory of corporate representation applies to a close corporation, the court
said:
At the time the contract was drawn, the individual interests would really
dictate what was done because the corporate firm [sic] would be only a
method of doing business chosen by the individual for the purpose of
promoting his private interests. In such a situation ... common sense
dictates that the corporate entity should be ignored.
Id. at 471,584 P.2d at 290. Consequently, the court held, it was improper for Banks and
Thompson to represent either Michel or the corporation when conflict developed. Id. at
473-74, 584 P.2d at 292. This holding was further refined by the court in In re Brown-
stein, 288 Or. 83, 602 P.2d 655 (1979). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983), involved the question of whether
counsel could take sides in a derivative action brought by a minority shareholder-direc-
tor against the controlling shareholder-directors. Kim Lundgren and his friend, F. R.
Klinicki, formed a corporation to operate an air taxi service in Berlin. Each owned one
third of the corporations' shares, and Lundgren's father Leonard owned another third.
Kinsey, who had previously represented Leonard Lundgren, was retained (with
Klinicki's consent) to represent the corporation. The board of directors was composed
of the two Lundgrens, Kim Lundgren's wife, Klinicki, and Kinsey. The corporation,
Berlinair, Inc. ("Berlinair"), applied for rights to an air route between Berlin and Saar-
brucken. The parties discussed the possibility of using a new corporation to pursue this
application, and Klinicki made clear his desire forpro rala ownership in that corporation.
Subsequently, the Lundgrens advised Kinsey that Kim and Klinicki had had a falling out,
and asked his advice in separating their business interests from those of Klinicki. Kinsey
organized Air Berlin Charter Co. ("ABC") as a vehicle for the Lundgrens without in-
forming Klinicki. Subsequently, Klinicki initiated a derivative suit against Kim Lund-
gren, Berlinair, and ABC, alleging deprivation of a corporate opportunity. Kinsey
continued to represent the corporations and the Lundgrens. The disciplinary proceed-
ing followed.
The court first held that Kinsey was justified initially in accepting employment by
both the Lundgrens and Berlinair since there was "no substantial reason" for him to
believe that doing so "would give rise to any conflict between these clients .... " Kinsey,
294 Or. at 554, 660 P.2d at 665. Nevertheless, he clearly acted improperly in agreeing
to form ABC and advising the Lundgren's with respect to it while also representing
Berlinair, and in continuing to represent the Lundgrens and Berlinair after commence-
ment of the derivative suit. Id. at 555, 660 P.2d at 666. "Simply stated, in a derivative
suit a minority shareholder places himself in the shoes of the corporation to enforce a
corporate right, and the interests of the plaintiff-shareholder and the corporate defend-
ant become merged." Id. The court distinguished the holding in Brownstein, 288 Or. 83,
602 P.2d 655, that counsel to a close corporation in reality represents the shareholders
of the corporation, and limited it to situations "where the controlling stockholder [is]
the corporation." In re Kinsey, 294 Or. at 562-63 n.10, 660 P.2d at 670 n.10. In the case
of a close corporation with a minority shareholder such as Klinicki, said the court, the
standard ethical precept that counsel represents the entity is applicable. Id. Cf In re
Bristow, 301 Or. 194, 721 P.2d 437 (1986) (stating that on the facts of that case, the only
position the lawyer could ethically take was to represent neither of the two competing
factions); In re Brandsness, 299 Or. 420, 427-28, 702 P.2d 1098, 1103 (1985) (affirming
that "Banks stands for the proposition that a closely-held corporation and its dominating
alter-ego President are so closely identified so as to preclude a lawyer who represents
the corporation from appearing against the president," but further stating that this does
not necessarily mean that such a lawyer could represent the president against a non-
dominant shareholder.). Thus, although the Banks rule does not go as far as the broad
dictum in Brownstein, its limits are not clearly defined. Obviously, I am disappointed that
Brownstein is not clearly the generally applicable rule.
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typology, it is useful to reexamine the peculiar problems of close
corporations. The most intractable problem is that there is no way
out; that is, no market for the shares exists, even if transfer is not
restricted by law or by charter, by-laws, or contract. Absent a voting
agreement or super-majority voting provisions (and sometimes even
where such devices are present), the minority shareholder is subject
to the will of the majority. The majority, therefore, has the power to
restrict distributions of the corporation's income and even to make
investment decisions for the minority (by sale of assets, merger or
consolidation). 149
All is not bleak, however, for the minority shareholder. The
controlling shareholders have a legal obligation to deal fairly with
him. More specifically, as shareholders (and as officers and direc-
tors, which they typically are), the controlling interests owe a fiduci-
ary obligation to the minority shareholders. 50  The minority
shareholder, in accepting a minority position, entrusts the majority
with his financial well-being. But some rules, albeit flexible, 15 exist
to guide the controlling interests in satisfying that trust.
What happens, however, when several shareholders (or cohe-
sive shareholder groups) have approximately equal rights to control
the corporation (whether by contract or stock ownership) and rela-
tively equal rights to share in the corporate wealth? Where rela-
tively equal interests exist that have roughly equal claims on
corporate wealth and machinery, a different problem arises. None
of these parties is likely to entrust the management of their invest-
ment to another. 52 Moreover, the laws governing their obligations
149 For a more thorough examination of the point discussed in this paragraph, see
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 39.
150 I will spare the reader yet another quotation of Cardozo's broad dictum in Mein-
hard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). However, the fiduciary duty ofjoint
venturers described therein has been attributed to controlling shareholders in close cor-
porations. Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). In Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d
482 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the court reversed a dismissal of summary judgment in favor of a
minority shareholder for, among other things, the right to approve certain organic
transactions which would otherwise be effected at the majority's will. In addition to
finding that the "controlling" minority had a fiduciary obligation to the majority, the
court emphasized that the minority shareholder's legal training, together with the fact
that he drafted the agreements in question, imposed on the minority shareholder a
"special duty" to the majority approaching that of an attorney to his client. Helms, 249
F.2d at 488.
151 See supra notes 28-31 and 52-59 and accompanying text.
152 Of course when a relatively equal shareholder actually does entrust his invest-
ment to another, the managing shareholder assumes greater fiduciary duties. Cf Mein-
hard, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (asserting this purposition with respect to joint
ventures). Such a case is not dealt with under the proposed rule, because even in such a
case it would be extraordinary for the passive shareholder to relinquish his voting rights
and other rights of stock ownership.
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to one another are not entirely clear. It is here, it seems, that the
potential for deadlock and insoluble conflict is greatest. The likely
resolution in such cases is not through the law, but through negotia-
tion between equals. 53
This is a point worth noting. Commentators generally have as-
sumed that, because those in control generally are capable of taking
advantage of the minority through the corporate machinery, a close
corporation in which unequal interests exist presents the greatest
potential conflict for counsel. Conversely, equal ownership is said
to be less problematic because of the equal bargaining strength of
the parties. Thus, Professor Hetherington observes (with respect to
the organizational stage):
Where only two parties are involved [in organizing a close corpo-
ration] and each takes half of the stock, the lawyer's silence [in
failing to point out potential conflicts] may be less of a disservice
[than where minority interests exist], since their equal bargaining
positions may permit the parties to arrive at a fair ad hoc settle-
ment should difficulties arise. On the other hand, where there is
to be a minority stock interest, or where there are more than two
parties, the situation is more difficult. 154
This conclusion is based on the correct (and in my view, determina-
tive) assumption that the proportionate shareholdings of the parties
is relevant to the duties of counsel. However, by focusing on the
parties' equal strength it risks emphasizing their negotiating posi-
tion to the exclusion of counsel's obligations to each of them. 155 In
the case of unequal ownership, at points of conflict counsel is obli-
gated to advise the majority that it must deal fairly with the minority,
and counsel may even be expected by the minority to represent
their interests. 56 In the case of equal (or practically equal) owner-
153 Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 39, at 27 (arguing that shareholders in
close corporations sue for dissolution, not to effect a termination of the business, but
rather to acquire a bargaining chip in negotiations for control).
154 Hetherington, Special Characteislics, supra note 8, at 17 (Professor Hetherington
makes this statement in the context of a discussion of counsel's disincentives to point
out potential intrashareholder conflicts to the shareholders of a close corporation). See
supra note 85. See also S. FirzGIBBON, supra note 13, at 13.
155 Cf Hazard, supra note 33, at 34, for the proposition that the "formation of corpo-
rate ventures" involves an arms-length bargaining process in which separate representa-
tion is more appropriate.
156 It may be objected that this would put counsel in an untenable position vis-a-vis
the majority on whom she depends for employment. In my experience this simply is not
the case. Clients, although perhaps reluctantly, accept counsel's advising them with re-
spect to a minority interest because they recognize that such counseling arises out of a
concern for their long-term legal well-being. Cf Patterson, supra note 3, at 48 ("the
client's rights and duties determine the lawyer's rights and duties") and 64 ("From a
legal standpoint ... the idea that the lawyer has a duty to conform to client's duties is
commonly accepted. The lawyer's failure to do so when it causes harm to the client is
grounds for a malpractice action."); Hazard, supra note 33, at 32 ("In consultations relat-
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ship, however, counsel will be caught directly between equally valid
claims. Fairness in such a situation will be significantly more diffi-
cult to determine. Almost any resolution of the conflict will harm
one of the competing shareholders or groups. Moreover, each of
the equal sides will expect counsel to assist in obtaining the advan-
tage sought by it. Therefore, it seems that the better approach
would be to permit multiple representation of shareholders in an
incorporated partnership only when ownership shares are not equal.
The situation of counsel in Lehrman and DeLaMaria illustrates
this point. Even to the extent that counsel assiduously has main-
tained an equal balance in the drafting of corporate documents allo-
cating control, the lawyer is literally caught in the middle when
tangible conflicts arise. In the Lehrman case in particular, Danzan-
sky's acceptance of the Class AD stock and election to the fifth direc-
torship ensured that he would be required to take sides in the event
of disagreement. This is obviously inappropriate where neither side
is represented separately by counsel, for each side will expect that
corporate counsel is protecting its interest. It might be argued that
in agreeing to the deadlock-breaking device, each of the Class AL
and AC stockholders should have recognized that they might be dis-
favored in a conflict, and that such recognition or constructive rec-
ognition was evidence that they did not expect counsel always to
take their side. But human nature is such that this may not have
been the case, and if it was, it may have been forgotten over time.
The point is that corporate counsel's active participation in such a
conflict is unseemly and should not be permitted.
Put differently, the parties' consent will never truly be informed
unless they anticipate specific, tangible conflict. And in such a situa-
tion, counsel is unlikely to provide clear, unbiased advice to each
participant unless guidelines external to the conflict (such as the will
of the founder in the true family corporation) exist. The conflict is
further exacerbated by the equal claim each party has to the corpo-
rate wealth. Counsel has a professional duty to avoid being trapped
in such a situation.
Brownstein and DeLaMaria suggest additional factors to be con-
sidered which could tip the balance in unclear situations. One is in
the introduction of a prospective business "partner" by counsel. In
each case, counsel had previously represented the new partner,
while the corporate founder was a new client. This suggests an ini-
ing to the representation, the interests of the third party... [to whom the client owes a
fiduciary duty] are always in contemplation .... Because the lawyer can interpret what is
being done in the same way a court would, the law expects the lawyer will in fact have
done that, and accordingly assess whether the requisite care and bona fides have been
manifested.").
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tial allocation of loyalties which should counsel against multiple rep-
resentation (for if the business fails and the new client goes away,
counsel will still have a relationship with the preexisting client)157
Another factor presented by these cases is the unequal sophisti-
cation of each client. In both Brownstein and DeLaMaria, the investor
introduced by counsel was known to have invested previously in
similar situations. This factor is highlighted in the case of a venture
capital syndicate making a portfolio investment. The venture capital
group is in the business of investing in close corporations. The
founders typically are creative or scientific types who may previously
have worked in business but who are not likely to be skilled or ex-
perienced in financial and legal matters. As a consequence of this
unequal relationship, the more sophisticated investors may assume
greater fiduciary duties which will factor into counsel's advice. 158
The one situation in which equal ownership may be less prob-
lematic is where one of the competing interests owns preferred
stock (whether or not it has voting rights) or other securities (such
as convertible debt) with clearly defined rights. In this situation, the
need for individual or class representation is diminished because, as
in the case of the true family corporation, the participants' rights to
the corporate wealth are relatively clear.' 5 9 This clarity is provided
by negotiated charter provisions or other contracts which detail pre-
emptive rights, antidilution, return on investment (in the form of
fixed dividends), liquidation preferences, and redemption rights.
Even more than in the majority-minority case, in this type of equal
ownership the obligations of one class of shareholders (the common
shareholders, who generally will manage the business) to the other
(the preferred shareholders) are relatively clear, and the advice to
be given by counsel is expressly circumscribed by the instruments.
Thus, multiple representation subsequent to the initial investment
should not be prohibited.' 60
157 See supra notes 34, 62 and 96.
158 See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
159 This exception loses strength where the preferred stockholders have voting
rights equal to the common stockholders and participation rights in the residual equity
which would make the situation more closely analogous to the equally-owned incorpo-
rated partnership.
160 Of course this suggests the need for separate representation at the time of in-
vestment, when the rights and obligations of the parties are first negotiated. Cf Hazard,
supra note 33, at 33-35. Thereafter, however, the relationship is more self-operating and
should not require the participation of separate counsel. It should be noted too, that
the opportunity for counsel familiar with the relationship (i.e., counsel who represented
the preferred shareholders in negotiating their investment) to participate in the resolu-
tion of a matured conflict serves as an alternative in the event the joint representation
becomes problematic.
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IV
A PROPOSED RULE OF ETHICS FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Having developed the typology and examined some factual sit-
uations within that framework, I shall now propose a rule of ethics
governing close corporations. The need for the rule is clear. Con-
sideration of the substantive law governing the relationships among
shareholders of close corporations should put to rest the frequently
asked question of who the client is. The client is, for purposes of
such relationships, the individual shareholders. The Codes have en-
tirely missed the boat by ignoring this fact (in the case of the CPR)
and by treating it as exceptional (in the case of the MRPC).
In reality, absent individual representation for each shareholder
(or for each cohesive group of shareholders) by independent coun-
sel, counsel for the close corporation must assume that she owes the
same professional responsibility to each shareholder and, indeed,
that she represents each shareholder with respect to corporate af-
fairs. Proceeding from this conclusion, the rule I propose is
designed to guide counsel by using the factors adduced in con-
structing the typology and applying them to reported factual situa-
tions. In other words, the rule is designed to tell counsel when
conflicts exist which make multiple representation inappropriate.' 6'
THE RULE
Where counsel is asked to organize or represent a corporation
which, under the relevant laws of the state of organization of such
corporation, is considered to be close corporation (which includes,
where required, situations in which the promoters or shareholders
elect to be so treated), counsel must recognize that his or her clients
include both the entity itself and, unless counsel is instructed to the
contrary, each of the shareholders of the corporation in their deal-
ings with one another. In such a situation, counsel may also repre-
sent the corporate entity in its external business dealings if the
proportion of shareholders required to elect directors under the
laws of the state of incorporation have consented thereto. 162 He or
161 The rule is drafted in the form of a presumption. This is primarily to take ac-
count of those situations, as in the disqualification cases noted supra note 148, where a
current or former shareholder (who may nevertheless be separately represented) asserts
that corporate counsel is his counsel for the purpose of disadvantaging the corporation
and its shareholders, even though the facts suggest that the parties have disavowed this.
Thus, the presumption may be rebutted by the introduction of evidence which proves
that neither counsel nor the movant considered or expected, at the time the movant was
a shareholder, that counsel represented the movant.
162 Although shareholder approval generally is not required for the retention of
counsel, where such counsel will also represent one or more shareholders the additional
caution of shareholder approval is appropriate. The proportion required to elect direc-
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she may not represent more than one of the shareholders individu-
ally with respect to matters involving the corporation unless:
A. (1) each of the shareholders consents to such representa-
tion 16 3 after counsel informs them of the possible dangers of mul-
tiple representation; and
(2) each of the shareholders has been given or inherited
their shares directly or indirectly from the original sole share-
holder of the corporation; or
(3) the capital structure (or proposed capital structure of
the corporation is such that
(a) a majority of the voting power and equity of the cor-
poration is owned by one shareholder and
(b) if more than one class of equity security is issued (or
to be issued),
(i) a majority 16 4 of the common stock of the corpora-
tion is owned by one shareholder,
(ii) no class of stock has greater voting rights than the
common stock, and
(iii) all classes of stock other than common stock have
clearly defined rights, preferences, dividends, and obligations
which are set forth in the certificate of incorporation, corporate
by-laws, agreements among the shareholders, or any combination
of the foregoing; and any person acquiring stock other than com-
mon stock is independently represented by counsel when making
that acquisition; provided that the holders of securities other than
common stock do not, in the aggregate, have voting power or eq-
uity participation equal to that of the common stock.
B. Where representation of multiple shareholders of a corpora-
tion has been undertaken in accordance with subsection (A),
counsel ordinarily may not continue such representation of multi-
ple shareholders:
(1) when any such a shareholder notifies counsel that he or
she no longer desires that counsel represent him or her;
(2) at such point as the circumstances described in subsec-
tion (A) no longer exist; or
(3) at such point as counsel's ability to represent the inter-
ests of any shareholder otherwise is compromised.
C. If counsel undertakes the representation of multiple share-
holders pursuant to, and in accordance with, this rule, he or she
tors has been selected because of the similar fiduciary relationship of counsel to the
corporation.
163 It is here that difficult questions of informed consent arise. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
164 The requirement of a majority draws an arbitrary line and not necessarily in the
best place. Query whether a 49% shareholder has the same legitimate expectations as a
51% shareholder. However, my argument suggests that a line needs to be drawn and,
for purposes of analysis, placing it at a majority is at least rational.
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will be presumed to have undertaken such responsibilities in an
ethical manner and without diminishing his or her responsibilities
to the corporation and each of its shareholders.
D. For purposes of this rule the term "person" includes any en-
tity. The term "shareholder" includes any "person" and the
terms "shareholder" and "person" include a "group of share-
holders" or "group of persons." The terms "group of sharehold-
ers" and "group of persons" mean two or more persons who own
shares in the corporation or intend or expect to own such shares
and who have entered into a binding agreement which sets forth
the terms upon which they will exercise the voting power of such
shares, purchase additional shares, and dispose of their interests
in such shares. 165
CONCLUSION
The rule I propose fills the void left by the CPR, which looks no
further than the presumed ability of a lawyer to exercise her profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each client, 66 and the MRPC, which
offers no assistance beyond the lawyer's reasonable belief as to
whether multiple representation will adversely affect the interests of
each client. 167 These standards, as noted earlier, give no particular
guidance to close corporation counsel. This is somewhat under-
standable, in that they currently function as exceptions to the spe-
cific rules governing entity representation (EC 5-18, in the case of
the CPR, and Rule 1.13 in the case of the MRPC). In the case of
close corporations, the circumstances contemplated by the excep-
tions have become the rules. It is, therefore, appropriate to give
counsel greater guidance with respect to a situation that she can rea-
sonably expect to encounter frequently.
I recognize that this rule is not perfect. In particular, the lines it
draws may be too bright, and therefore may occasionally result in
the unnecessary proliferation of legal fees resulting from the reten-
tion of separate counsel. It may be particularly problematic in
smaller communities. 68 In addition, it ignores problems of coun-
165 A different, but equally defensible, approach might be to define "group" in a
manner similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission's definition of "affiliate" as
"a person that directly or indirectly through one or ore intermediaries, controls or is
controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (1988).
166 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
168 The answer of the court in In reJans, 295 Or. 289, 666 P.2d 830 (1983) is persua-
sive in recognizing the irrelevance of the fact that the maintenance of ethical standards
may be inconvenient:
We are fully aware that this unyielding rule may raise concerns, particu-
larly in smaller towns where two clients of the same lawyer, with conflict-
ing interests, often request the lawyer to serve each of them regarding a
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seling where the activities of directors or officers, independent of
their roles as shareholders, present conflict of interest problems. 169
Nonetheless, the rule does attempt to address a problem too often
shrugged off as insoluble by the legal community, and relegated to
exceptional status by the drafters of the Codes. It recognizes that
the substantive law necessitates a rethinking of entity representation
in the close corporation context, and it attempts to provide some
uniform guidelines for counsel in determining the propriety of her
actions in such situations.
transaction between them. There cannot be an exception for small
towns.
Id. at 295 n.7, 666 P.2d at 833 n.7.
169 Such a situation might arise, for example, in counseling a divided board with
respect to the unlawful payment of dividends where the directors are jointly and sever-
ally liable. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1967).
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